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Preface
This thesis Is an attempt to provide an exposition 
of F. R. Tennant*s thought on the problem of evil* This 
problem is always a pressing one for Christian theology, 
and it is felt that it will be of some value from both 
the practical and theoretical standpoints to have brought 
together all of his work in this field, including his 
thought on the related questions of the nature and origin 
of sin, inasmuch as Dr» Tennant has made a first-rate 
contribution to the philosophy of religion, and in par- 
ticular has not only provided an outstanding treatment 
of the problem of evil itself* but has been chiefly re- 
spcnslble for an important new view of sin* John Oman, 
for example, in his review of Philosophical Theology« 
referred to Tennant f s work on the problem of evil as 
"certainly of very exceptional wisdom and power". For 
these reasons, then, it is hoped that this thesis will 
be of some value to the various purposes of Christian 
thought.
The general plan is that of first setting forth an 
exposition of his thought, unalloyed by any attempts at 
criticism, and then to add under separate chapters some 
consideration as to the extent of its validity and sat- 
isfactoriness. The principal chapter is the third, which 
is an exposition of his theodicy. It is preceded by a
first chapter which Is of an introductory nature and sets 
forth his philosophical theology in general, and a second 
chapter which is an exposition of his views on the nature 
of sin* The concluding fourth and fifth chapters are of 
a critical type* and deal successively with his views on 
sin and on evil*
Though Tennant's theodicy is the principal, subject of 
this thesis, it will readily be seen that it has been neces- 
sary to deal to an, even greater length with his treatment 
of sin, not only because the problem of slnfulness stands 
in close relationship to theodicy, but also because the 
volume of his writings has. been greater in this regard than 
in the case of his work on the theodicy itself*
I wish to express my .gratitude, to my supervisors. 
Professors John Baillie.and W. S, Tindal, for their valuable 
suggestions, which, I hope, have been adequately put to use 
in this thesis.
The spelling followed throughout is that approved in 
"The Little Oxford Dictionary of Current English11 , 3rd, 
edition.
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Frederick Robert Tennant was born in 1866 at Burslem, 
Staffs, and received his early education at Newcastle- 
under-Lyme. As an undergraduate at Calus College, Gam- 
bridge (1885-1889) he worked chiefly in physics, mathe- 
matics, biology, and,chemistry, and in Part II of the 
Natural Science Tripos his principal study was chemistry.
He continued his scientific work, and began a study 
of theology, while employed as Senior Science Master at 
his old school (1391-1894), taking his B.Se. at the Uni- 
versity of London and his M.A. at Cambridge the following 
year. He then served as Curate of St. Matthews, Walsall 
(1894-1897)* following,which he again took up residence 
at Cambridge, first as Chaplain of Caius College, then as 
Curate of St. Mary the Great, and began his study of phi- 
losophy under James Ward. While holding a college student- 
ship (1899-1902) he wrote The Sources of the Doctrines of 
the Fall and Original Sin* and was during the same period 
Hulsean Lecturer (The Origin and Propagation of Sin),
From 1903-1913 he was Rector of Hockwold, Cambridge 
awarded him a B.D. in 1904, a D.D. in 1906, and called him 
to be University Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in 
1907* From 1913 until his retirement in 1938 he was Lec- 
turer in Theology at Trinity College. He has also been a
Fellow of the British Academy, was given an honorary D.D. 
toy Oxford, and delivered the Tarner Lectures in 1931 (Philo- 
sophy of the Sciences),
Orientation
Tennant's method is,that of empiricism* He acknowl- 
edges that the validity of his system depends upon an ac- 
ceptance of the empirical method, and that empiricism Is 
definitely a minority movement in the history of philosophy* 
Though a priori philosophies are numerous, he employs per^ 
sistently "the empirical, Inductive* and explanatory method,
adopted in varying degrees of fragmentariness and complet©-
1 
ness by Locke and Butler, Lotze and James Ward", asserting
that it has "become possible since the advent of a psychology 
of common experience* to improve upon the Lockean empiricism 
which had led to an impasse*
The greatest single influence upon his thought was 
James Ward, affirmations of indebtedness to him abounding 
throughout his works* Especially in psychological,,matters 
was Tennant influenced by Ward, and in this respect also by 
Gr* F. Stout. He alludes to Stout's distinction between
'psychic* and 'psychological' immediacy as becoming one of
2
his "most powerful philosophical searchlights"* He fre- 
quently speaks highly of Kant and McTaggart, and thougja he
Philosophical Theology» II, p. 24?. 
2The Journal of Theological Studies. XXXIV, p. 96.
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was not able to rest content with Kant's 'half-hearted 
phenomenalism 1 , and could not accept McTaggart's a priori 
premises, his admiration for and debt to them is often made 
obvioua. James Martineau and Lotze also figure prominently 
in the. development of,certain aspects of his philosophy*
More germane to the subject matter of this thesis are 
the facts that some of the ethical ideas of Sidgwick and 
A. E« Taylor are used to support the ethical foundation of 
his conception of sin, that he explicitly acknowledges that 
Otto Pfleiderer first advanced some of the ideas connected 
with his views on sin, and that his theodicy concerning 
physical evil includes appreciative references to Ward and 
especially to Martineau,
Tennant's general philosophy
The following pages of this chapter are an attempt to 
summarize,his general philosophy and theology so as to^pro- 
vide a suitable introduction to the,specific problem at 
hand, inasmuch as "the philosophical problem of evil can 
only be approached after the adoption of a definite on- 
tology and doctrine of God. M This summarization Is made 
from his two volumes of Phiiosophlcal Theology (Vol. I, 
The Soul and Its Faculties; Vol. II, The World, the Soul, 
and God), where his empirical theism is extensively set .
The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 12j5n.
forth* Three of his books deal entirely with the. subject
of this thesis* two more are essentially elaborations of
2topics whose main ideas are included in his magnum OPUS,
while the last remaining one is not of great importance to 
either his general philosophy or to this thesis.
This summary exposition will proceed largely according 
to the plan of development used by Tennant himself, inas- 
much as his is a carefully laid edifice, built,block on 
block, and because it will, the,better serve to throw into 
sharp relief the empirical method which is his philosophical
compass.*
The first volume is philosophical, and the second is 
theological* And in this arrangement may be seen the key 
to his method, which is that of beginning with the facts of 
this world and of the nature of man, and of proceeding there- 
after to find an explanation of them* This "quest for a 
philosophy dictated by experience.and facts, with indif- 
ference to theological issues" (II, 210), is, in its order 
of inquiry, initially concerned with what is first known by 
the human mind, not with any supposed metaphysical priori- 
ties or "a priori guesses at truth11 (II, 165): i*©» the 
ordo cognoscendi is adopted in preference to the ordo 
essendi*
o
Philosophy of the Sciences, and The Nature of Belief*
 ^Miracle and Its Philosophical Presuppositions* The 
general conclusion of this study: alleged miracles are 
of no evidential value inasmuch as the capacities of 
natural law are not as yet fully known*
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Thus Tennant begins with the observable facts of 
human experience rather than with any. preconceived theory 
of reality* and builds upward from this foundation* letting 
our."prima facie fact-knowledge" suggest an appropriate in- 
terpretation. Some of this 'presumptive knowledge 1 , he 
recognizes, may upon inspection come to be considered in- 
valid., but that it ,is nevertheless the only safe point of 
departure is his firm conviction.
"If to set out from fact, and to keep in touch with 
.fact, be called empiric!sin,. then* whatever else be 
found necessary, the empirical method is a sine qua 
non for knowledge of actuality of any sort" (I, 5).
In setting out from this presumptive knowledge Tennant 
rejects the epistemological method and all "pre-scientific 
philosophising11 (II, 150) on the ground that it is hazard- 
ous to regard thinking and knowing as independent faculties, 
without first undertaking the harmless inquiry as to how 
our knowledge came to be* or to assume without investiga- 
tion that our reason is suited to grasp a supposed rational 
world, in favour of the method of analytic and genetic psy- 
chology* He holds that psychology is "the fundamental 
science, the first propaedeutic to philosophy11 (I* 11)^
The first datum of psychology as indicated by Des- 
cartes 1 fundamental certainty is that there is a self- 
conscious self. Self-consciousness* logically and actu- 
ally, however, implies consciousness, and it is with thifi 
concept that Tennant initiates his philosophical invest le- 
gation. Consciousness, it is immediately seen, involves
a subject* What the nature of the subject is, is another 
question, but its existence can scarcely be questioned   
there being no such entity as subjeetless experience* To 
be sure, there are several, subjective elements in con- 
sciousness, namely, feeling, conation, and attentive ac- 
tivity* Thus T-ennant concludes his initial investigation 
by asserting that
H:our prima facie facts, our data, could not be what 
they are, unless (1) there is a unique kind of 
erleben» viz. consciousness, which (2) involves an 
existent subject that (3) has determinate states 
and activities11 (I, 32).
Tennant continues tiy recognizing that the primary 
analytica on the objective side of experience are sense- 
impressions* These sensa are presented to a mind which 
receives them and .  acts upon them in such a way as to give 
rise to perceptions and thought* Sensa are thrust upon 
us from the first, and in this very process they amount 
to being percepts, the results of complex fusions invol- 
ving subjective activity, rather than pure Isolated sensa, 
else the mind,, could never advance to richer experience* 
Though Tennant believes that there is an important measure 
of truth in Loeke's dictum that there is nothing in the 
mind that was not first in the senses, he nevertheless 
maintains that the mind does not merely passively accept 
impressions, but contributes something to the organiza- 
tion and correlation of sensa* Thus from the very begin- 
ning he sees a common basis for sense and thought, with 
neither being independent of or reducible to the other,
"The common root is neither sense nor thought.... 
It is the actual sensatlo. ..consisting partly or, 
and being accompanied by, operations J^t are *l- 
ready vague and implicit or germinal thinking U>
This continuity of development of knowledge out of sense 
is not clearly understood by psychology, but Tennant be- 
lieves that it must be posited if we are to have a way of 
accounting for human,.mentality*
Perceptions are then held to be the mind, 1 s construc- 
tions out of sensa, before the subject has benefited from 
communication with others* and between percept and concept 
he draws no hard and fast line of demarcation* The percept 
results from both the subjective and objective realms* 
there occurring from the first a slight degree of uncon- 
scious 'interpretation 1 of the objective* And at the 
moment of perceiving, we are not conscious of any mental, 
synthetic activities, i.e. it seems that our experience is 
immediate, "unanalysable and unconditioned by previous ex- 
perience" (I, 46). Thus Tennant endorses the distinction 
between 'psychic 1 and 'psychological 1 , as denoting the 
difference between experience as it seems to the experient, 
and as it appears to him or to another upon objective re- 
flection*
Images differ from impressions among other ways in 
that they are dependent upon previous impressions. They 
are outgrowths of complicated fusions of impressions. For 
example,
"there is nothing in the complex image of a non-actual 
thing, such as a mermaid, that was not previouslv 'In 
the senses'" (I, 52). J
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Memories are the effects of impressional presentations, 
and are not identical with them or there would not exist 
the capriciousness of memory. But that they are to some 
extent accurate is assumed, in Tennant f s system, for he 
feels that it would otherwise be impossible to account for 
our accumulation of knowledge.
Tennant states that the level of Ideation is now at- 
tained, though to be sure, he recognizes something of a 
crude idea even in the percept. As soon as the mind ef- 
fects a conscious distinction between existence and es- 
sence the level of the abstract has been attained (abstract- 
ion occurs when, for example, 'chairs 1 are thought about 
without regard to any particular chair). Nevertheless, 
ideas, though reached by abstraction from particulars, and 
consequently not actual or real, may still be valid of the 
perceptual, and herein Tennant effects a distinction be- 
tween validity and reality (I, 64). And a concept will 
have to spring from its perceptual framework if it is to 
be considered as having an actual counterpart. Thus it 
is clear that, as in the order of knowing, universals are 
preceded by particulars, universals not being known with 
psychological immediacy, but with psychical immediacy 
which seems to be unconditioned by previous conditions. 
And thus, for Tennant, "there are no thought-given reali- 
ties" (I, 65). To sum up:
"Ideas are mind-made tools, derived from the imagina! 
and therefore, at a further remove, from the lmr>res 
sional or perceptual: derived from fwhat is in the 
senses' b£ 'the mind itself" (TT56).
The first characteristic of conception being abstrac- 
tion, Tennant maintains, the second is the explication of 
relations between things, this process being accentuated oy 
inter-subjective intercourse, with our knowledge of the self, 
of others, and of the world advancing slowly by means of mu- 
tual interaction. But, he holds, before knowledge of other 
selves as such is possible there must be some crude notion 
of one's own self. This first appears in knowledge of the 
bodily self, subsequently in self-consciousness., and then 
through analogy the affirmation of other selves is reached 
(I, 72). The Idea of a pure ego, or soul, is the last to be 
acquired in the order of knowing, albeit that in virtue of 
its being presupposed In all knowing it Is in. logical order 
primary. The pure ego is known about mediately and.reflec- 
tively, for we have no immediate acquaintance of it.
The pure ego, or soul, he asserts, is numerically sin- 
gular, individual, and possesses idiosyncrasy; it is neither 
merely cognitive nor a passively receptive tabula rasa, its 
chief characteristic being to function; and It is real or 
ontal, not phenomenal* The soul is substantival, continuant, 
and efficient. As to its origin and destiny, or how it came 
to be embodied, psychology, according to Tennant, is not able 
to say.
The nature of personality Is comprised of three factors, 
according to Dr» Tennant. The soul, that which is unique and 
distinctive in each individual, is the first factor in the 
determination of personality; the second factor is heredity,
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or the sum of inherited endowments; and the third Is en- 
vironment, The inheritance includes instincts and talents; 
talents are realized combinations of sensory keenness and 
tempo, mental agility and retentiveness, which vary with 
the individual and are liable to Improvement , whereas in- 
stincts are common to the race and do not change through 
the growth of the individual. For his inheritance as well 
as for his pure ego man is not responsible, for both are 
simply given* Responsibility attaches only to the use sub- 
sequently made of this material*
Volition, one personality ingredient, is not innate, 
Tennant continues, but is the outcome of the presence of 
sensory perception, feeling, conation, ideation, and atten- 
tion* "There Is no such thing as 'the will'...there is 
only a subject that wills'1 (I, 131). Volition is not the 
mere result of various determinations, and cannot be con- 
sidered by way of physical analogies, because it involves 
questions of end and value. Motives are not to be con- 
ceived as standing over against the subject, but are the 
subject in action deciding its own course: "an actual mo- 
tive is the tending of a subject to act11 (I, 135). Thus 
freedom of volition is asserted to be 'subjective deter- 
mination of volition', freedom and responsibility being 
affirmed*
Tennant maintains that though aesthetic and moral 
ideas are not reducible to any of these bases, they never- 
theless arise out of combinations of elemental feeling.
11
desires, and thought, these acquisitions being an instance 
of epigenesls rather than of strict evolution, which is an 
unfolding of the preformed. And with the attainment of the 
social level of experience there appears *conscience'«
Sense-knowledge, then, is what is gained in, sensatio, 
and is generally characterized by certainty and necessita-. 
tion, while the first operation of the mind or understand*- 
ing, as distinguished from sensatio, is in finding or mak- 
ing explicit the existent relations between percepts.
In regard to the 'forms of intuition 1 which Kant dis- 
tinguished from the categories of the 'understanding** 
Tennant advances the view that the concept of space is gradu- 
ally and inevitably reached by the mind in Interaction with 
objects, and is not an immediate or innate 'pure 1 intuition* 
The more fundamental concept of time,, developed through ex- 
perience of duration, succession, and simultaneity, differs 
perceptually and conceptually, conceptual time being ac- 
quired by eliminating the peculiarities of perceived change.
There are formal and real categories of the under- 
standing, he notices, the formal including the mathematical 
and logical kinds* The mathematical singularity and oneness 
of things is derived by the mind from the sense-given, and 
the logical categories are reached through comparison, aa 
for example the categories of likeness and diversity, these 
formal categories being matters of certain and universal 
fact. However, Tennant holds, with the real categories of
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substance (abiding unity) and cause (efficient activity) 
we are on a somewhat different plane, for they are supposed 
or 'read In 1 , and then verified*
These foregoing considerations concerning the capaci- 
ties of the human mind thus introduce us to Tennant's in- 
vestigation of thought as thinking-process* Thinking is 
viewed by him to be an experimental process* a type of 
guess work, and is not mere observation or logical rela- 
ting: It seeks unity and Identity in diversity. Thus he 
finds that it is a largely aloglcal process which produces 
conclusions for logical method to handle*
As for the difference between the terms 'reason 1 and 
'rational 1 , the former Is associated with the "teleological 
and conational,. interpretative and analogical11 (I, 191)* 
and the latter is associated with formal logic* Reason has 
often been regarded as an original or divine faculty, or 
lumen naturale» but psychology, he asserts, is not able to 
find any such faculty*
At this point in his developing philosophical struc- 
ture Tennant considers the various theories of knowledge. 
Rationalism is seen by him to be based upon several un- 
founded dogmas such as, for example, that reason is a fac- 
ulty Independent of sense, and in general rests upon an in- 
valid identification of thought with knowledge. He contends 
that as psychology has found no ready-made original faculty 
as reason, reason does not develop in independence of the
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acquisition of sensory experience. More precisely, "rea- 
son comes not so much out of, as through or by means of, 
sense" (I, 197)* And although it Is permissible to call 
that mental capacity which makes knowledge possible, a 
priori* there is no original,a priori knowledge. Actually, 
Tennant pronounces, rationalism has often held,as self- 
evident, axioms, which are in reality empirical inductive 
generalizations.
Empiricism, employing the ordo cognoscendl* is of 
course the method preferred by Tennant for acquiring know- 
ledge, and indeed is held by him to be the only sure and 
valid method.. Empiricism has been employed much less fre- 
quently than rationalism, he acknowledges, and has not been 
pursued thoroughly by any single thinker, unless it be James 
Ward (I, 217). Empiricism cannot acknowledge any validity 
in the rationalistic method of deducing or deriving
11 the actual from the possible, existence from essence, 
.qualitative diversity from identity, the qualitative 
from the quantitative, the finite many from the in- 
finite or absolute One, the perceptual from the con- 
ceptual, the historical from the timeless, causal 
rapport from logical or from factitious relation, 
change from immutability" (I, 218).
In turning to the other eplstemological. enquiry as to 
the nature of our knowledge or what it is that we know, 
Tennant considers realism,, idealism, and phenomenalism. 
Phenomenalism, of a more advanced kind than Kant's, is for- 
warded by Tennant as the only solution which accounts for 
the facts. The noumenal world is known through the phe- 
nomenal world: our knowledge may not be an exact copy of
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reality but it is at least 'relevant 1 thereto* In any case, 
he insists, phenomenal knowledge is sufficient to enable us 
to see meaning in the world, even without absolute ontal 
knowledge.
The inductive generalisations of science which provide 
the premises from which deductive logic may operate are of 
a probable nature, Tennant stresses* and are not to be taken 
as logical certifications* They are not self-evident in the 
sense of being unmediated intuitions, and they are not>ca~ 
pable of rigid proof: they are pragmatically verified hy- 
potheses, possessing relevance to Nature and overwhelming 
conviction, it may be, but they cannot be regarded, as strict 
logical proofs. Thus probability is seen by him to be the 
guide of science as well as the guide of life*.
Psychology deals with the believing process* Tennant 
continues* and logic or epistemology deals with propositions 
believed; the former is concerned with certitude ('I am cer- 
tain that 1 )* whereas the latter is concerned with certainty 
('It is certain that')* Psychologically, belief differs 
from knowledge ("or what passes for 'knowledge 1 worth hav- 
ing", I, 296) only in degree, there being no sharp anti- 
thetical distinction between the two. 'Faith 1 differs from 
'belief* in that it is more conative than cognitive, belief 
being mere assent more or less thrust upon us, whereas faith 
is a venture common to science and religion, extending be- 
yond the realm of given actualities to the ideally possible
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(a most common occurrence, he claims). Trust differs from 
faith in the respect that it presupposes belief in an es- 
tablished object*
Tennant sums up his argument thus far by stressing the 
fundamental importance of our sensory experience as the 
original basis of all our higher thoughts and ideas:
"It is sense that furnishes the.essential core of the 
primary meaning of reality, involved in the distinc- 
tion of knowledge from thought; and it is only "by con- 
ceptual supplementation of sense-data (and the subjec- 
tive states they evoke) by minds which, through Inter- 
communion, have attained the common standpoint, that 
there emerge the notions of Reality, phenomenal and 
ontal or ultimate, the physical sciences and metaphys- 
ics. Religious beliefs and theological doctrines also, 
according to such theory of knowledge, can only be 
derived indirectly from study of the sensible world, 
man's soul and human history (I, 306)«
Going on to a consideration of religious experience, 
Tennant alleges.that if normal religious experience contains 
any unique cognitive or affective elements that are not 
found in other types of experience it must be in virtue of 
a unique experience-producing object, otherwise there is 
nothing distinctive In the components of .religious senti- 
ment* To posit an objective numinous or spiritual envi- 
ronment is sufficient, he holds, to account for such -psy- 
chically 1 immediate, though not 'psychologically 1 immediate, 
apprehension of the numinous, It is a further question 
however whether such an environment is real and not merely 
imaginal or ideal, it being well known that the latter cate- 
gories of conceptions inspire great emotions and conduct 
when they are believed in.
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That mystical experience occurs cannot be gainsaid, 
Tennant declares, but it would be invalid to accept un- 
critically the mystic's own interpretation of it if the 
mystic asserts that it is immediate or certain or has meta- 
physical implications* If the mystic's experience Is con- 
fessedly ineffable, then, though It cannot be proved that 
he was not In contact with reality, It is IP so facto of no 
value for knowledge inasmuch as his truth-claims cannot be 
tested. As for that class of mystical experiences which 
are described to some extent, Tennant asserts that there 
is usually an unconscious readlng-ln of interpretation, or 
theological content, into the experience, a doctrine or 
philosophy which was learned previously under normal condi- 
tions, so that even if they are perhaps valid private ex- 
periences they are nevertheless without value for truth* 
Similarly he finds no psychological reasons for substantia- 
ting the claim that in mystic experience there is exercised 
a higher faculty.
"It would seem, then, that religious experience in 
general, and mystical experience in particular, af- 
ford no reasons, as distinct from psychological 
causes, for doubting that all that can be called by 
the vague word 'knowledge', is dependent on sense 
and thought" (I, 324).
Of the relation of religious belief to natural know- 
ledge, Tennant maintains that the knowledge which we have of 
ourselves, of others, and of the world provides the surfI- 
cient framework for a natural rise of religious ideas and 
theological beliefs, no 'transcendent faculty* being needed.
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Whether such views are valid or reasonable can only be 
established latterly, Tennant insists, "by use of the dis- 
cursive method and by comprehensive survey of 'knowledge 1 " 
(I, 325). Differing intellectual beliefs throughout the 
world account for the many differing religions, religious
experiences occuring throughout the world: what differ-/***»
entiates them one from another are the varying intellectual 
contributions, the uniqueness of religious experience being 
always determined by the theological concept previously 
developed by the mind and automatically and unconsciously 
infused into the experience.
Tennant finds suggestions towards a teleologlcal in- 
terpretation of the world in (1) the intelligibility of the 
world, (2) the apparent adaptedness of organic beings, 
(3) the appropriateness of the inorganic world as a home 
for life, (4) the world's evocativeness of aesthetic values, 
(5) the Instrumentality of the world to the productiveness 
of morality, (6) the emergence of human rational and moral 
capacities. The essential question is then seen to be 
whether this ordered Nature is the result of wisdom or of 
undesigned chance, and it is emphasized that in view of the 
wonderful complexity of the world the latter explanation 
needs still further explanation. Though the teleologlcal 
Inference from these cumulative facts to the notion of "a 
creative Spirit" (II, 113) is not atrictly a logical one, 
Tennant believes that it is nevertheless by no means un- 
reasonable. In fact, the sufficient ground of all these
data appears to him to be that of "an efficient, Intelli- 
gent, ethical Being11 (II, 121),
Yet, though design implies creation, Tennant contends 
that no more than a finite God or a spiritualistic plural- 
ism is required by teleological, empirical considerations. 
He refines the idea of creation to the assertion that God is
"essentially the world-ground or creator; not another cause in the series, or a being who might or migiht not have created* God qua God Is creator, and the creator qua creator is God: or 'God without the world is not GodT..»,Creation can be conceived as Idea and deed together, and the divine transcendence as not temporal priority, but as consisting in the differ- ence between God and His utterance which pantheism Identifies" (II, 129).
This world-ground, by virtue of being creator and de- 
signer, that is, by virtue of possessing Intelligence, valua- 
tion, and volition, is held to be personal* And, if per- 
sonal, then self-conscious* From unity of purpose to singu- 
larity of purposer, however, is a further question for 
Tennant,
In any case, we are free to use the term God, Inasmuch 
as there is unity of purpose. In Tennant' s system God is 
'non-infinite 1 , and in view of God's creation of free crea- 
tures with a certain amount of creative ability, this self- 
limitation necessarily limits His omniscience concerning 
some of the particular results of freedom* even though the 
general world-scheme is under His control and omniscience^
Prologue to the problem of evil is Tennant f s assertion 
that this Is the best possible world. And with this recog- 
nition he hurries on to define the terms 'best 1 and 'possible 1
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'Best 1 is taken to refer to instrumentality to moral values, 
rather than to mere sensual pleasantness. And concerning 
the term 'possibility 1 , Tennant alleges that the notion of 
God without a world is an abstraction, and if the general 
arrangements of this world had been different from what 
they are, we would be confronted with a different kind of 
God. In other words, upon observing actuality the human 
mind then invents many possibilities*
"God and his world are the ground and cause of the 
distinction between the possible and the impossible, 
and between the possible and the actual" (II, 183).
Determinateness excludes possibilities, Tennant emphasizes, 
and God never was an indeterminate being. The eternal 
truths are neither the prius nor the product of Godfe being 
and activity. But if the world was to be a suitable place 
for morality, it had to be of a developing kind, for 'mo- 
rality 1 requires freedom and cannot be created ready-made. 
And so we have "an evolutionary cosmos in which free agents 
live and learn, make choices and build characters" (II, 185).
Tennant's theism in its transcendent aspect holds that 
though the nature of the world depends on the nature of 
God, who is its ground, and not vice versa, the world is 
other than God and possesses a measure of devolved auto- 
nomy. Yet there is also an immanent activity involved in 
the realization of values in the world. And in a sense 
there is a divine influence in man, but this influence* 
Tennant claims, must be regarded as a general activity,
for ethical theism
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cannot think that God would override moral personality* It 
is not necessary, he thinks, to invoke immanent activity to 
account for mankind's acquisition of rationality, morality, 
conscience, theology, etc*, nor immanent inspiration to ac- 
count for the progressive discovery by man of the nature of
God.
Tennant recognizes that there is indeed a sense in 
which there is a revelation that enables men to attain in- 
sights into and develop knowledge about the heart of things, 
but this he holds is never to be construed as impressed 
coercion* And with alleged communications of truths above 
reason he allows empirical theology no concern, 'revealed 1 
religion, as in Christ for example, being the culminating 
phase of natural religion* "Christ revealed God in that he 
understood Him and has enabled us...to see as he saw" 
(II, 241).
Thus "God and the world and man is the theistic for- 
mula for the totality of what is known to exist" (II, 255). 
In the order of knowing, Tennant reaffirms, God is known 
last, while knowledge of the self and the world grows gradu- 
ally and interdependently from the first stages*
"The world and man constitute an organic whole whose 
ground is (rod, and whose ralson dM?tre is realization 
of the good, or love11 (II, 259)*
Dr* Tennant*s philosophy has been challenged at the 
point of its treatment of knowledge of other selves and of 
God by the 'I-Thou* epistemologists of recent times, whether
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effectively or not does not matter to the specific subject 
of this thesis, and of course more or less orthodox theo- 
logians would not find themselves able to accept his judge- 
ments in regard to religious experience, Christology, di- 
vine immanence, providence, revelation, etc*
His thought, though thoroughly and consistently em- 
piricistlc in method of procedure, may safely be termed 
'rationalistic 1 in the sense that he makes an attempt to 
explain everything in terms of the categories of.human 
reason, without recourse to the category of 'paradox 1 which 
has been extensively employed in contemporary theology. 
The validity of several of the doctrines of Christlanity, 
at least in the present state of knowledge, of course^ 
stands or falls with the choice between a theological,method 
which attempts thoroughgoing explanation and one which em*- 
ploys *paradox*»
Tennant's Philosophical. Theology has, however, been 
highly acclaimed even by some who are unalterably opposed 
to his method and his approach to theology* It is on the 
recommended reading lists at Yale, Union, and Garrett Semi- 
.naries, in the U. S» A», where it has apparently had more 
influence, especially upon some of the younger teachers and 
writers, than in Great Britain, John Bennett referred to 
It as "the most persuasive statement of the intellectual 
basis for Christian faith11 which he knew; 2and the highest
example, William Temple, in his preface to his
Nature  Man and God,o '     i.
^Christianity and Our World, p. 65*
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praise has been offered it by, e.g., John Oman, R. L. 
Calhoun,2 W. a. DeBurgh,^ £. Dawes Hicks, 21" Charles Gore,5 
and C. D. Broad, whose following summary reaction is wor- 
they of consideration:
"I cannot, indeed, pretend to believe that ethical 
theism has been, or could be, established by such 
arguments as these....(but) Dr. Tennant's method 
at least ensures those who use it against nonsense, 
enthusiasm, and credulity....and, if one must try 
to explain the ultimate and formulate the innefable, 
Dr. Tennant's type of conclusion is perhaps the 
least unintelligible explanation and the least mis- 
leading formulation available to us here and now11 ."
Though it has been thus highly regarded by many lead- 
ing thinkers, it has not as a rule become familiar to semi- 
nary students, about whom it was said by Broad: "they 
could not be better employed than in studying Dr. Tennant's 
work11 . 7
^ Journal of Theological Studies, XXXI, p. 406.
^Journal of Religion, XI, p. 461.
3journal of Philosophical Studies, III, 12, p. 542.
4-Hibbert Journal, XXVIII, p. 174.
5The Philosophy of the Good Life, p. 257n (Everyman
edition).
gMind, XXXIX, pp. 483-4. 
"Mind, XXXVIII, p. 94.
23
Chapter II; The Nature of Sin
Definition of Sin
In his endeavor to formulate a definition of sin such 
as will be unambiguous and clear-cut, and acceptable to 
both ethics and essential Christian theology, Tennant first 
consults the concept of sin that appears in the New Testar- 
ment. He realizes at the outset that the. theologiansf In- 
terest is not simply with 'moral evil 1 , but also with the 
relation of man to God, God being the ground of the dis- 
tinction between good and evil and the one judge and.for- 
glver. Though sin is always moral evil, it is for the 
Christian antithetical not only to moral correctness but 
also to holiness, sin .being "the Christian name for what 
ethics calls 'moral evil* 11 * Tennant finds In the Gospels 
that Jesus brands as 'sin 1 only those acts which are con- 
trary to the known will of G©d and for which the Person can 
be considered responsible, and. asserts that
"there is no case in which He can, without question, 
be considered to call, or which compels us to infer 
that He would call, by the name f sin*, any deviation 
from the objective right or good, in which the agent 
was, through no moral fault of his ogn, ignorant that 
he was contravening the law of GodH »
From this Tennant concludes that a conception of sin 
cannot include as sinful.any actions for which men.are not 
accountable to God without conflicting with Christ's express 
teachings about sin* Paul he sees to have allowed himself
1The Concept of Sin, p. 24. 
2Ibid.. p. 29. 
3Ibid«, p. 33.
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at times to apply the term 'sin 1 alike to guilty and guilt- 
less conduct, and to thereby initiate an inconsistent usage, 
but by and large the essential idea that Tennant finds in 
the New Testament in this respect is the association of sin 
with 'guilt 1 . 1
In his full definition .of sin Tennant maintains that 
there are four essential.conditions of sinful conduct. The 
first condition is the existence of some, standard of which 
sin is the falling short, 2 He does not allow ethical per*, 
feet Ion as a standard, however, for though all sin Is im- 
perfection, not all imperfection is sin*^ And the usage of 
ethical perfection as an absolute,standard by which conduct 
is to be regarded.as sinful or sinless entails the neglect 
of natural differences in dispositions and capacities. For 
example*, a man who struggles hard to overcome some bad habit 
unwittingly acquired and who yet may not attain to the level 
of excellence of one who by nature disliked such a habit* 
may not be considered as virtuous or perfect as the latter, 
but from another standpoint is actually more meritorious, 
Accordingly, Tennant insists that if the concept of perfec- 
tion is to be used as the standard by which we are to meas- 
ure slnfulness, It must at least be interpreted not as ab- 
solute but as a 'sliding-scale 1 relevant to the varying
4 
capacities of differing persons.
1Ibid.. p. 43* 
2Ibid., p. 47. 
3Ibld.» p. 48. 
4Ibld., p. 57.
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There is a further question, Tennant notices^ as to the 
proper definition of ethical conduct. In agreement with. 
Kant and Sidgwlek, he maintains that the proper sphere of 
the 'ethical 1 has to do with that conduct which is the direct 
outcome of volition and intention, the good being the good 
will Itself and not the talents and wisaom which a man may 
possess.
The point seems obvious to Tennant, then, that the usual 
connotations of the terms 'perfection 1 and 'moral excellence* 
include more than can properly lie within the sphere of 
'ethical 1 evaluation and condemnation, and, if
"the value which we assign to extra-volitional factors in conduct and 'character 1 , in virtue of their power to evoke admiration in us, be not 'strictly* ethical, there remains the further quest ion, whether it should be called 'ethical 1 or 'moral' at all"* 2
Quite frequently, Tennant states, Christian theolo- 
gians overlook this and employ some such standard as per- 
fection or moral excellence as a norm by which to regard 
conduct as sinful or not, whereas they should have been 
careful to distinguish what is actually aesthetic approval 
from what is strictly ethical approval, for though "ethics 
and aesthetics are, of course, cognate sciences",^ ethics 
loses its unique standpoint unless it is concerned solely 
with instances of merit and demerit* He stresses that the
.. p. 66. 
2 Ibid. . p. 67. 
3lbid.. p. 70.
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distinction between ethical goodness and aesthetic beauty 
of conduct must be maintained, especially when the questions 
of sin and deviation from ethical standards are under con- 
sideration.
"An artist may rightly be disparaged, as an artist, if 
he be deficient in the powers of imagination and con- 
ception and in the ability to give skillful expression 
to the product of these powers; but as a moral being a 
man cannot be blamed for deficiency in natural endow- 
ments such as might render his approximation to the 
mixed ideal of 'perfection 1 easy. Ethics, in the 
strict sense, has no concern with the 'talents 1 , their 
nature and amount, committed to an individual nor with 
the total to which they contribute; its evaluation is 
applicable only to the volitional use made of them".
And if one does allow any such absolute standard as the. cri- 
terion of meritorious conduct a sharp contrast Is thereby pre- 
sented between ethics and traditional Christian theory, for 
ethics Is not permitted to sanction the view of "relative . 
and varying perfection", whereas theology has as a rule em- 
ployed the view of "absolute and Invariable perfection".
This general contention is aptly illustrated and. con- 
firmed by Christ's charge to love God with all our heart* 
soul, and strength, to love God, in other words, as best as- 
one is able, regardless of how He migftt be loved by another.^ 
It is, indeed, generally agreed that Christ's injunction that 
we be perfect even as our Heavenly Father is perfect needs 
qualification in order to be understood by or have relevance 
to us. To "be perfect must necessarily mean one thing in the 
divine case and another in the human, for perfection requires
1Ibld., p. 71. 
2Ibld.. p. 77. 
3Ibld.» p. 76.
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the use of such intellectual and non-volitional capacities 
as do not seem to be granted to man; and therefore the ideal 
of perfection is held by Tennant to be unattainable under 
our present dispensation of finiteness, and though we may be 
entitled to speak of imperfection when.this ideal is un- 
realized due to insufficiency or endowment, it is not open 
to us to use the term 'sin 1 .
This point being maae, the remaining alternative In- 
terpretation of 'ethical perfection 1 is seen to be the full 
and best use of whatever abilities we may possess. This 
ideal will, in accordance with mankind's diverse and vary- 
ing talents and stages., necessarily be a non^static, fluc- 
tuating, standard^ dependent in its application upon dif-
o
ferlng instances.
"Perfection is thus ..comparable to a fixed ratio rather 
than to a. fixed quantity. The falling, at any moment, 
below the standard of excellence possible to an indi- 
vidual at that moment, will be something which the in- 
dividual mifiht have avoided and ought to have avoided; 
it is really and truly sin*1 .2
To those who might object to this conclusion on the 
supposition that it is a rather useless conception because 
of its indeterminableness.* Tennant,suomits tnat it is the 
only definition wnich is free from inconsistency, ana that 
it is not our business to judge even if we could perceive 
all sin that is committed. And in any case, as only God 
can forgive sin, so He alone is able in most cases to know




tne inwardness and extent of sin. 1
By way of concluding these foregoing emphases, Tennant 
affirms that an absolute standard cannot be superimposed on 
the behaviour of men of any type or nature,
"without making sin a metaphysical necessity, a eon- 
. sequence of the limitations belonging to the finite
as such: without making sin, in fact, precisely what
it is not"* 2
The traditional view or sin seemed appropriate, Tennant 
stresses, to theologians and philosophers who did not have 
the conceptions of development and growth ready to hand, but 
he thinks that the recent prominence of these conceptions 
has uncovered difficulties not previously recognized, with 
the result that the prevailing orthodox concept of sin, like 
several other theological .beliefs, now needs to be recon- 
sidered in the light of .modern studies*
The view which thus far emerges from the considerations 
mentioned above is that sin is "deviation, during a given 
stage of moral growth, from the highest that is, attainable 
at that stage", * this idea emphasizing as constant the form 
rather than the content of the moral standard, and actually 
strengthening, according to Tennant, the claim of morality, 
for
H it is only because morality, in the sense of a code 
.or content, is everywhere relative to circumstances 
and natural conditions over which men have no control, 
that it is. binding, as to its form, in any place or at 
any time".4
How God will deal with men who fall short of the right and
. p. 81. 
2lbid., p. 83. 
3lbid. , p. 85. 
4Ibid.» p. 85.
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the good merely through lack of talent or privilege is the 
office of God Himself. In any case, we may feel assured 
that
"God at least does not expect His children to make 
bricks without straw; nor does He deem them guilty 
for lack of what He Himself has withheld from them 
....The 'law 1 of which sin is the transgression must 
rather have a different content for different men, 
and for the same man at different times"  *
The second condition of sinful - conduct listed by 
Tennant is awareness by the individual of some norm or 
standard as binding upon him, i»e. a person cannot be ad- 
judged moral from another person's surveyal of him, unless 
he is aware of an ethical norm himself* The individual must 
possess or have access to some knowledge of a moral standard 
which ought to be fulfilled or ought not to be violated, and 
he must have this knowledge at the time when the action oc- 
curs, otherwise his conduct cannot be said to be relevant to
pmoral considerations.
It is, in fact, generally accepted that it is the mo- 
tive and intention which is commendable or reprehensible 
rather than the mere external congruity of behaviour with a 
moral standard, such congruity being of no moral signifi- 
cance, and that an action may be quite immoral even though 
it fits perfectly with the.ideal* Instances of nonmoral 
beings with no capacity to judge right or wrong or to be 
aware of a moral law are lower animals and infants* Those 
who would censure the infant's unrestrained Impulses,
Ibid., pp. 86-7. 
2Ibid., p. 92.
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Tennant declares, are logically obliged to do the same with 
cats and birds, and, in fact, falling rocks*
Passing on to a consideration of persons such as primi- 
tives and heathen who though crudely aware of some rudi- 
mentary ethical law have yet never been confronted by an 
advanced ideal, Tennant asserts that their relation to the 
ideal is exactly similar to the relation of nonmoral beings 
to any ideal at all. Such a person who is by circumstances 
Ignorant of a great ideal or of any ideal at all is non- 
moral, in regard to that ideal even if .he in no way fulfills 
it* His falling short is unavoidable, and therefore non- 
moral*^
The words 'at the time 1 in an above quoted statement 
were carefully chosen by Tennant as being important in,de*- 
termining what conduct is sinful, as is illustrated by the 
cases of heathen who are converted to .Christianity* Upon 
the advent of the new instruction,such persons very often 
condemn their previous conduct, though it may have been , 
fully in accordance with the light then available, to them* 
But it must be denied that such self-appraisal is Just, he 
-insists, if they were doing the best possible to them in 
their earlier state. Regret might be a legitimate emotion 
in this Instance, but a remorseful feeling of guilt would 
not be*3 To speak of a person's conduct as sinful, when he
.. pp. 96-8, 
2Ibld.. pp. 99-100. 
3Ibid., P. 102*
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was not at the time aware that there was a higher standard 
being transgressed or unfulfilled* is to either misidentify 
sin and imperfection, he states, or to confuse an earlier 
with a later condition.
But though it is true that we must not be held account- 
able for failing to do what is impossible for us, and that 
'sin is not imputed where there is not law 1 , Tennant acknowl- 
edges that there is nevertheless a guilty ignorance which is 
quite a different matter from innocent ignorance., God again, 
of course, being the only good judge of the one and the other*
"Knowledge slighted, trifled with, obscured, and even- 
tually lost, is not at all the same thing as knowledge 
unreceived and inaccessible* Nor is knowIe<l$Q which 
one might have been in possession of but for indolence, 
indifference, or aversion to consequences".2
Then, he asks, what about a person who through persis- 
tent misuse of moral functions gradually loses the power of 
conscience, and whose volitional and cognitive abilities de- 
teriorate? Of the guiltiness involved in letting oneself 
enter a state of moral atrophy he has, no doubt* but this 
event he distinguishes from the question of sinfulness at- 
taching to acts committed when the powers of will* appre^ 
hension, and conscience have declined to the point of de- 
moralization (though he thinks it is unlikely that complete 
moral atrophy ever occurs)- Then is the sinner in no wise 
responsible for his behaviour after moral decay sets.in* 
granting that he is certainly accountable for the situation 
having come to exist, as he is for his actions while in a
Ibid., p. 103. 
2Ibid., p. 106.
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comparatively alert stage of moral apprehension? Tennant 
maintains that inasmuch as one has to be capable of moral 
knowledge, discrimination, and volition before his conduct 
can be censured as ....sinful,
"he does not add to his guilt by the objectively wrong 
deeds which he commits after that his moral preroga- 
tives have been lost. Being no longer moral, he can 
no longer sin11 .*
Toward substantiating this claim Tennant adduces the 
instances of human behaviour during seasons of great emo- 
tion or passion, such as fear, anger, and intoxication, as 
examples of conduct which common sense seldom regards as 
guilty or sinful. We may hold responsible though, he de- 
clares, the man who lets himself get into such states, even 
without considering as sinful his actions while in insen- 
sible states* And as to the behaviour of psychotlcs, Tennant 
notices that^scarcely anyone today imputes guiltiness. All 
these, then, are recognized.as types of character which are 
quite obviously from an external and objective standpoint 
reprehensible, but which current common sense defers to the 
realm of the nonmoral.^
Upon completing this point, that the moral absolute 
which is binding on all men is the obligation to do the best 
one knows to do, whatever his faculties and the circum- 
stances, Tennant makes it clear that this view
Ibid., pp. 112-3. 
2Ibid., p. 114. 
3Ibid., pp. 116-7.
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"does not detract from the majesty of the moral law or 
tamper with its flexibility. Rather does it safeguard 
both. The content of the moral ideal, in so far as It 
is a moral ideal for a particular person, is determined 
by the distinctive nature of that person and the con- 
ditions of his environment* Christian theology must 
maintain this if it would remain faithful to revealed 
knowledge of God Cnot to speak.,of consistency with the 
bare requirements of ethics/11 *
And he is convinced, that this view>does not lessen the sill- 
fulness of sin, Inasmuch as it recognizes, that men have not
lived up to the standards which they are capable of, and
o 
therefore rightly deserve the judgement of a Just God,
The third condition of ,,,slnful conduct is represented 
by him to be the fomes peccatl, the crude material out of 
which the will constructs sinful activity, the identifica- 
tion of this 'material of sin* with sin Itself, according
to Tennant, being a confusion which leads to serious dlffi-
 5
cultles.
Tennant f s discussion at this point deals extensively 
with psychological questions. Though ethics is a normative 
science, it is held by him to presuppose an empirical sub- 
structure of facts, and thus he sets out from a psychologi- 
cal basis,
The simplest mental attitudes are Recognized to be 
those of pleasure and pain, usually termed 'feeling 1 . They 
are thrust upon us and we only passively receive them; for 
example, pain is occasioned in us by a toothache, and pleas- 
ure from kindness shown us. Emotions differ in that they 
can to some degree be controlled by the will, though they
2 Ibid., p. 120, 
3lbld. . p, 124.
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are rather similar to instincts and appetites, and are 
neutral prior to the operation of the will.
"No one can help feeling anger, physical fear, or 
.antipathy, on occasions; any one may erect on them 
vindictiveness or righteous wrath, cowardice or 
courage, irrational hostility or charity, respectively. 
As incentives to volition and action, suppliers of mo- 
form part of the material whence sin may be
'v 2 *"'* *<r<"sr/!^' c '
The different conative activities are discussed at this 
juncture. There are blind organic cravings, such as hunger 
and thirst, hunger becoming 'appetite', however, when to any 
degree the mind recognizes some object which can satisfy the 
craving. And appetites differ from instincts in the spon- 
taneity of their appearance, and from impulses in that they 
are more deep-seated and under less volitional control, the 
satisfaction or frustration of appetite being inevitably and 
normally accompanied by sensations of pleasure or pain*^
Instincts, of which there are very few, are inherited., 
adaptive responses to external stimuli, and as they are for 
the most part "superseded rather than regulated by voli- 
tion" , they can scarcely be included in the fomes peccati. 
An impulse differs from an instinct in that it results 
partly from a craving as well as from the excitation of a
stimulus, and issues in an uncoordinated, undeliberate way
4
out of the circumstances of the moment.
When an impulse is directed by some thought of the 
consequences or end which is involved, Tennant continues,
.. pp. 125-50.
2 Ibid. . p. 130. 
3lbid. . pp. 132-3. 
. . p. 135.
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it is more properly known as 'desire 1 , man's desires "being 
the expression of his character, with his character often 
including a field of conflicting desires* The selected 
desire, further, becomes a 'wish 1 , ana wrtn tnis assertion 
Tennant arrives at a discussion or the will. In this re- 
gard, he notices that people often wish something without 
actually willing it, inasmuch as will also involves inten- 
tion and activity, will being not mere wishing, but a con- 
scious action performed with some end in view.
It is possible to study the characteristics of purely 
impulsive human behaviour* without resort to conceptual 
abstraction and its attendant pitfalls* Tennant contends, 
because such activity is presented.in the behaviour of the 
child,, who has not yet acquired volition or conscience* it 
being important to examine the nature and development of 
human mentality in order to ascertain the materials from 
which the will manufactures sin. In his effort to find out 
how sin arises in the race and in the individual* Tennant 
sets out to compare human nature as it is before and after 
morality emerges* hoping that such a comparison will serve 
to clarify the difference between nomnoral imperfection and 
sin itself, and to emphasize the sometimes disregarded dis- 
tinction between sin and the 'material of sin'. It should 
further, he thinks, bring home the truth that the will is 
destined, upon the emergence of morality, to an indefinite 
struggle with the subverting habits of sense and impulse, 
which are by that time firmly situated in human nature.
1Ibid., pp. 136-7.
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Again, the will does not produce sin from a vacuum "but 
from some fomes peccati* and this material, though it must 
be differentiated from sin proper, is nevertheless an in- 
dispensable element in the construction of sinful behaviour, 
and must be considered in any account of the nature and ori- 
gin of sin. "It supplies the motive to the will without 
which sin is not only inexplicable, but impossible",
These conative tendencies, he pronounces, are (1) 'non- 
moral 1 . They are nonmoral because involuntary, morality 
being relevant only to what is voluntary; some are held in 
common with brutes concerning whom no one attaches moral ,
judgements; and they are part and parcel of our nature ba-
o
fore the advent of both volition and conscience. Whatever
uae of these propensities the will makes previous to the 
emergence of moral knowledge Tennant holds to be of no moral 
consequence, though he recognizes that to many the apparent 
alliance of the incipient will with these hereditary pro- 
pensities has seemed to be a stupendous occurrence fraught 
with theological significance, with the consequence that 
there has been a great vogue for theories of radical evil, 
original sin, a timeless fall, and a bias toward evil, etc. 
It seems to Tennant just as fair, however, to assign a bias 
toward good to the emergent will, inasmuch as it certainly 
does not always align itself with objectively regarded evil, 
and he infers that to whatever extent the infant performs 
good actions rather than bad ones, to that extent it is just
»f PP- 138-40.
2 Ibid., p. 140.
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as appropriate to posit a bias toward good* As a matter of 
fact, Tennant insists, the only bias the will can have is 
that which it works out for itself through its own activity. 
And the idea of a bias toward evil neglects to recognize 
that volition and morality develop gradually; indeed, the 
idea can only be presented upon the foundations of the doc- 
trine of original righteousness and the obsolete faculty 
psychology.
These conative tendencies are (2) 'neutral 1 , in that
p 
they may be used by the will for good or evil.
"Our impulses and passions can therefore no more be 
called 'sinful 1 , in the strict sense, than alcohol 
or dynamite; and such use of language should be ban- 
ished from what professes to be exact theology".5
And (3) these tendencies are 'necessary 1 to the con- 
tinuance, health, and growth of life,. They are normal human 
endowments by virtue of Divine creativity, said man is not 
accountable for the first difficulty of properly using thenu 
Tennant finds no reason for tracing the existence of these 
tendencies to a corrupted inherited nature, and maintains 
that before the child reaches the level of morality and re- 
sponsibility, his impulses are merely the expression of his 
life's purpose.
He then proceeds to emphasize that this material of 
sin is as indispensable as is the will before sin can be 
produced, and that the .conflict between 'flesh' and 'spirit' 
is an inevitable if not a logically necessary precondition 
of human morality. This conflict, he decides, can no longer
., p. 142.
2 Ibid., p. 143.
Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 167, 
Concept of Sin, p. 145.
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be regarded as the result of some early fall or timelessly 
acquired bias* Such propensities must now be regarded as a 
necessary and normal Inheritance from our animal ancestry, 
volition and moral reason being the superadded endowment, 
the so-called 'divine image 1 in man.
These conative tendencies which persist even after as- 
sertion of reason and will, Tennant concludes, are the re- 
mainder of our pre-human, ancestry, being developed in the 
automatic and Impulsive nature of the animal, with no view 
toward the future moral life of man.
"They still assert themselves without alteration or 
obsolescence now that morality has been attained; and 
they operate entirely Independently of moral ends and 
moral Judgements* There is no pre-established har- 
mony in the life of man whereby appetite shall only 
be evoked on occasions convenient from the moral point 
of view*.»^Henc@ arises unavoidably the conflict be- 
tween appetite and conscience, between lower and 
higher desire"»*
And so a large portion of the moral life is occupied 
with the control and regulation of natural and normal im-. 
pulsive tendencies. Man is not to blame, Tennant holds* if 
the satisfaction of such impulses brings enjoyment, nor Is 
he to blame for the circumstance that these pleasures are 
more attractive in the early period of morality than those 
resulting from the noble use of conscience* This fact of 
conflict, of human conduct divided with Itself, he maintains 
to be the indispensable setting for the production of moral 
behaviour. A world without temptation or motivation toward 
evil would be an impossible field for the growth of character,
 ''Ibid., p. 146, 
2Ibid., p. 148.
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for it Is only through conflict with self that moral per- 
sonality is able to develop. It would not have been pos*- 
slble, he believes, for men ever to have developed conscience
had we always been creatures of one motive, with no incentive
o toward evil.
And by way of summing up thus far, Tennant emphasizes 
that
"a concept of sin such as shall be of universal appli- - cation must be framed in the light of the indisputable facts that man is conscious before he is self-conscious, impulsively appetitive before he is volitional, and volitional before he is moralH «*
The fourth condition of moral conduct he determines to 
be the real capacity for effective choice between a recog- 
nized higher and lower alternative. Now, he states the 
characteristics of volition to be intention, activity, and 
freedom. As for intention, not all the. consequences of will- 
ing are actually intended, and such they must be if they are 
to be liable to moral evaluation; though, on the other hand* 
our Lord made it clear that the intention alone is sufficient
to make sin, whether or not any activity is involved or any
4result ensues*
The will, of course, must be free if moral censure is to 
attach to any of its actions* Freedom of the will does not* 
indeed, have to be argued to most Christian theologians* and 
in the present connection Tennant does not dwell upon it at 
great length* This freedom is neither indeterminism nor mere
1Ibid.. pp. 149-153.




caprice, he stresses; there are always conditioning circum- 
stances and determining factors present, but these anteced- 
ents are not the entire explanation of conduct,, for freedom 
of choice ,is exercised in the moulding and directing of this 
'plastic material 1 .
"The self is the character plus something more,... (and) 
  in its transcendence and partial independence or 
all past experience   lies the real spring of moral
decision".2
Real freedom, such as this description provides, though it 
may not be strictly demonstrable, is of course a necessary 
ingredient of morality and a precondition of the possibility 
of sin, and must be accepted, if Christian theology is to 
have an ethic, as the most satisfactory explanation of ex- 
perience. Tennant concludes this consideration by acknowl- 
edging that the entire basis of morality collapses if the 
concept of freedom with its logical corollary, responsibility, 
is abandoned. ̂
The impulses and appetites described above, he recog- 
nizes, are usually termed 'primary springs of action 1 , and 
lead to the consideration of 'secondary springs of action* ., 
or those desires which are infused with a degree of volition, 
it being with the emergence of the higher modes of conscious- 
ness, such as self -consciousness, will, and conscience, that 
these secondary springs first occur, and in which we can 
first recognize the possibilities of sinful behaviour*^ And 
with the rise of such additional springs the mind soon becomes
., pp. 164-5- 
2Ibid. . p. 166. 
3lbid. , p. 171. 
4Ibid. . p. 182.
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able to invent and imagine means for intensifying appetites 
to more frequent demands for satisfaction, the areas of temp- 
tation being stimulated by the misuse of Improved powers of 
thought and imagination.
As temptation has sometimes been confused with sin, it 
is important, Tennant thinks* to clarify this point before 
proceeding with the formulation of a concept of sin* Now, 
temptation does not occur, he states, unless the person in- 
volved is aware of at least two conflicting desires or lm^ 
pulses within him, the one of which he believes to be of in- 
ferior worth* And it must be remembered that the degree of 
the merit in resisting temptation depends on the strength of 
the appealing desire, lest the fallacy that the amount of dif-
ference between conduct and some objective standard of per-
o 
fection determines the amount of sin is re-embraced.
Temptation, of course,, is not sin. Some temptation is 
the result of human habit and ingenuity, but in the first in- 
stance it precedes any moral choice, and in general its in- 
cidence is not the fault of human volition; Jesus Christ him- 
self was tempted, yet remained without sin.^ What the will 
does with its temptation indeed becomes a matter for censure 
or approval, because the will may determine which directions 
the attentions of the mind takes, and it can Intensify motives 
to dominate other motives, "It can thus strengthen weaker, 
and weaken stronger, 'motives 111 .
Sin, then, does not appear until volition has acquiesced
., p. 186+
2lbid. , pp. 189-190. 
3lbid.« P- 192. 
4Ibid., p. 193.
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In a desire forbidden by the conscience. But as It may be 
sinful to think on something without doing it, it is also 
sinful to 'court 1 temptation, to play with an idea known to 
be wrong, even though the action is not performed.  * 
That an accurate theory of sin is of direct moment for 
the practical devotional.life as well as for doctrine may be 
seen, Tennant hopes, in the cases of many religious persons 
who in their introspective fervor invalldly overburden them- 
selves with feelings of guilt.2
This concept of sin is further valuable, Tennant main- 
tains, In that it helps us to form a more adequate view of 
human nature, i.e., it neither allows the pleasures of-sense 
to be regarded as intrinsically degrading, nor sanctions the 
supposition that it pleases God when,we suppress any such, 
proper pleasures, for it recognizes them as one of the heav- 
enly gifts meant to be cultivated and enjoyed.^ And it
teaches us that such poetic terms as 'sinful appetites 1 and/
'evil impulses' are not legitimate theology, because not
4valid psychology.
Lest the foregoing treatment seems to moral psycholo- 
gists oversimplified, Tennant ..appropriately says that an 
dividual *s conflict with self is not a mere battle between 
right and wrong   rather as a rule are the appeals.of the 
good and of the evil complexly intermingled in our experi- 
ence* ̂
In concluding this consideration, Tennant recognizes
., PP. 195-6. 
2Ibid.. pp. 197-8. 
5lbid.. p. 199. 
4-Ibid.. p. 201. 
5lbld.. p. 202.
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the distinction between sin as a state, and the separate 
sinful products of the volition* Repeated indulgence, though, 
he sees, strengthens the appetites and desires and makes it 
increasingly difficult to refrain from sinful courses, and, 
accordingly, sinfulness comes to inhere not only in parti- 
cular evil actions but also in the character itself, which 
is a 'habit of will 1 , 1
These four mentioned conditions, then, are necessary to 
sin, that is, if sin is regarded as wrong activity for which , 
a person is responsible and accountable, and therefore guilty, 
and if, conversely, the term sin has no bearing upon any con-
o
duct which was either unavoidable or irresponsible*
Tennant rejects the attempt to base a doctrine of sin . 
upon the .individual's 'sin-consciousness 1 , or sense of guilt, 
by Invoking the distinction between the 'psychic 1 and 'psy- 
chological'.-' Responsibility, for example, may validly be 
asserted, of a person whether or not he Is conscious of re.«- 
sponsibility, even though from the psychic standpoint it de- 
pends upon the degree of awareness experienced by him. And 
conversely it is true that a feeling of responsibility is
sometimes felt when from an objective or psychological stand -
4point such a feeling Is not justified* Thus, even though
men cannot be held accountable for (objectively regarded) 
evil deeds which they to the best of their intentions con^ 
sidered proper, It is also Impossible in the ligfrb of modern 
psychological discoveries to measure guilt solely by the
.. p. 207 . 
2Ibid.» p. 209.
. above, Ch. I, p. 7« 
Concept of Sin, p. 223.
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feelings of responsibility that a man may have, it being 
true that many have crushing self-imposed burdens of guilt 
where no guilt can be imputed at all* Then, for this reason, 
Tennant refuses to equate guilt with consciousness of guilt* 
nor sin with the sense of sin. The Idea of guilt must con- 
note accountability, he claims, guilt and sin being "corre-
P lative and coextensive11 ; and the same four conditions which
he found for the possibility of. sin he presupposes in any 
imputation of,.guilt. And* therefore, inasmuch as there is 
often no actual sin accompanying psychic consciousness of 
sin, and often sin where no conviction of sin occurs, there 
exists no necessary connection between sin-consciousness and 
sin, and,
"the individual's psychical.apprehension of sin or 
guilt*..cannot possibly supply a foundation on which 
an universal .concept of sin can be construe ted11 * 3
Briefly, then, Tennant defines sin as "moral imperfec- 
tion for which an agent is, in,God's sight, accountable11 .^ 
And by way of clarification and substantiation of this con- 
cept he adduces the following summary considerations:
"This concept, it is claimed, is logically perfect: It 
.is constant and universal, and also definite. It Is 
the only one which can fully satisfy the implications 
of the most fundamental.of Christian doctrines* It 
alone is unimpugnable by psychology, ethics (in the 
stricter sense), science, and history. It alone safe- 
guards sin from confusion at once with Imperfection 
(moral, aesthetic, or physical), with Ignorance, with 
nonmoral conatlve tendencies, with temptation, with un- 
real counterpart to illusory individual experience* And 
if on these accounts it should be Indispensable to 
Christian theology and ethics, It would seem to be also
1Ibld., p. 226. 
2Ibld.» p. 237. 
3lbld., p. 244. 
. p. 245.
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or great Importance in its bearing upon the moral and 
religious conduct of life. On the one hand it strikes 
at the root of morbid self-accusation and discourages 
the usage of unreal and exaggerated language: on the 
other, it leads to a doctrine of Sin that may be called 
1 inward 1 * It encourages honest searching of the heart 
and sifting of motive, condemning not merely the deed 
of violence, but also smouldering hate: not only im- 
moral acts but the cherishing or secret lawless desire* 
It thus insists, more strongly than can any concept of 
wider and looser meaning, upon the responsibility.of the 
sinner for his sin. And this is its most important im- 
plication. While pronouncing nothing to be sin but that 
to which guilt attaches, it unconditionally declares that 
to every sin there attaches guilt. It refuses to shift 
one whit of the responsibility for real sin to the sub- 
ject's environment, the conditions of his life, or his 
natural endowments. Volition, and volition alone, it 
declares to be sinful* Conversely, immoral volition Is 
affirmed to be sin   and nothing else: not disease, or 
inherited weakness, or unavoidable effect of surroundings 
or any thing but guilty and accountable transgression 
that ought not to have been and might not have been"*-*-
The Origin of Sin
Tennant endeavors to trace the origin of sin in the race 
in the light of the conception of evolutionary development, 
and assumes as highly probable that the physical,nature of 
man is a continuous outgrowth from that of the lower animals. 
The study of anthropology, to begin with, has made available 
a generally accepted pattern of the racial growth of man out 
of primitive, crude beginnings* In the earliest society, the 
'tribal self 1 was all-Important rather than the 'personal 
self: there was a solidarity of group consciousness* "The 
ethical sentiments and the Judgments which express them11 ..were, 
Tennant quotes A. E. Taylor, "in their most primitive form...
245-7.
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impersonal". Then, out of early merely arbitrary cere- 
monial practices there in time arose a type of introspective 
morality, a personal sanction and morality. Now, in view 
of early savage and brutish practices, Tennant thinks that 
there is every reason to believe that man's moral sense, 
that is, "his discovery of a law by which he came to know 
sin11 , 2 was slowly acquired* and as.man only gradually emerged 
from a condition of non-morality to a level of reflective 
morality, he finds it difficult if not impossible to Isolate 
any first sin* Thus he sees that the origin of sin would 
have been a gradual process rather than a sudden and abrupt 
fall.5
"The appearance of moral evil* from the evolutionary 
point of view, would not consist in the performance of 
a deed such as man had never done before, or whose 
wickedness he could previously have been fully aware* 
and for which shame and guilt, as feelings differing 
in kind from any known before, would overwhelm him; it . 
would rather be the continuance of a primitive society 
or group of individuals in certain practices or in the 
satisfying of certain natural impulses, after that these 
things had come to be regarded as conflicting with a 
recognized 'sanction 1 of ethical rank as low as that 
of tribal custom* The sinfulness of such acts would , , 
gradually Increase from zero, which was its value in 
the time of man's nonmoral innocence, as the moral code, 
grew more exacting and more full of content, and the 
individual's sense of Its binding nature deepened* From 
the point of view of our ethical standards, i.e*, ob- 
jectively considered* the first sins of humanity would 
be as the sins of early childhood; not the most heinous 
and momentous in the race's history, but rather the 
least guilty of all".4
The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 90. Quoted from 
Problems of Conduct* p. 124. For a full account of the 
higher moral concepts, obligation, conscience, responsi- 
bility, merit, etc., Tennant recommends Taylor's chapter 
on the "Roots of Ethics".
2Ibid., p. 91. 
5Ibid., p. 92. 
4Ibid.. p. 93.
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And concerning the question of the guiltiness of such ac- 
tions, Tennant maintains that the degree of guilt depends 
not upon the standard which is transgressed but upon the ex- 
tent to which the person could have realized himself to be 
subject to the standard, and upon the respect for it which 
he was capable of feeling*
Though these conclusions .concerning the origin of sin 
in the race are recognized by Tennant to be somewhat 'in- 
ferential and theoretical in nature, despite our anthropolo- 
gical knowledge and analogies from contemporary savage life, 
he believes that the realm of empirical fact is entered when 
investigation, of the origin of sin in the individual begins* 
The foundation, true of the Individual as well as of the 
race, from which Tennant starts, is that men-are natural be- 
fore moral beings, the impulses of human nature being firmly 
established-before any moral consciousness arises* Infants 
are held to be simply nonmoral animals, their impulses and 
propensities being essential to their nature, their experi- 
ence first beginning on the sensory and affective level, with 
imagination and volition appearing sometime later, and with 
finally a rudimentary form of reflection and social morality 
beginning to dawn.^ At first the infant
"is a sentient automaton, adapted for parasitic depen- 
dence upon its environment. The intensity of the young 
child's appetite is, biologically, a sign of future 
health and vigour.,..Only one sanction is as yet known 
to the infant   that of success; the knowledge of good 
and evil has not yet emerged* The formation, therefore, 
of the earliest habits is a nonmoral phenomenon".^ .
». p. 93. 
. , pp. 96-8.
3Lecture, "The Child and Sin", pp. 167-8, The Child and 
Religion, ed. Thomas Stephens.
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Indeed, though the child has great capacity for learning and 
adaptation, he has among animal species the barest of ready- 
made endowments. Such tendencies as the child does show are 
not only natural to his created nature, and neutral in char- 
acter as to what may be made out of them, but in fact are or- 
ganic necessities.
"Pear and anger, envy and jealousy, self-centredness 
.and self -pleasing are qualities which form part of the 
birthright of the human being in virtue of his animal 
ancestry. . ..They are natural and normal and necessary. 
It cannot be said of them, when we speak with reference 
to man in his yet unmoral is eel condition, that in any 
sense 'they ought not to be 1 . They are nonmoral". 2
These propensities are seen by Tennant to be the common 
ground of the good and bad. What the will does with them may 
become a matter of sinful conduct, but in themselves they are 
neutral- in character: "they belong to man* as it has pleased 
God to make him, i.e., through evolutionary process11 .^ In 
fact, he states that since we now believe in the . evolutionary 
connection between the physical natures of man and the ani-
mals, we must also regard these propensities as inevitable
4
survivals of the evolving course of Nature. However, Tennant
warns, even today many people allow themselves to speak care- 
lessly of them as wicked, 'sinful appetites 1 , thus perpetua- 
ting the age-old Maniehaen dualism.^
Actually, Tennant asserts, the infant in following his 
Impulses and Instincts is entirely fulfilling his life's
Origin and Propagation of Sin, pp. 98-9. 
2 Ibid., p. 101.
^Art., "sin", p. 702, Encyclopaedia Brit^anica. XX. 
lecture, "The Child and Sin", op. cit. . pC 167,
Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 103.
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purpose, and certainly at first cannot in any way control 
them* The infant is not responsible for the fact that they 
are deeply imbedded in us at birth, and no responsibility
attaches to the fact that they continue to call for satis-
2
faction even after the appearance of will and conscience*
Indeed, the infant for some time does not even know what he 
is doing. Later through instruction there begins a slow 
growth of knowledge of some law, and then conscience soon 
appears* This
"law to which he has learned to bow from various mo- 
tives, the child can neither anticipate nor understand* 
In his attempts to do so he often blunders. He finds* 
however, that his parents and teachers also obey it**., 
Some of the law's content is learned through suggestion 
and Imitation* through instruction, and reflection* And 
so there grows. up for him a moral ideal which is taken. , 
over into himself *.   And it is continually revised and 
expanded throughout life* Thus In temptations the child- 
begins to get accustomed to the presence in him of some- 
thing which represents his rather or some other law-givi| 
personality* Much experience is necessary to separate 
the abstract idea of good and bad from that of the will 
of his parents. Good is, at first, what is permitted, 
and evil 'what is forbidden. But long before this separa- 
tion of abstract from concrete has been effected, the 
new self that has thus arisen calls the child to account 
if he yields to his 'self of habit 1 * Here is conscience; 
and as it Is being acquired one ceases to be Innocent 
with the innocence of ignorance of good and evil11 **
Thus, in Tennant's theory, "the Fall is exchanged for an 
animal origin and a subsequent superposition or acquisition 
of moral .personality11 * And this exchange in no way affects
the doctrine of man's need for grace and redemption, he 
serts* Man is as sinful as ever, because all have been ob- 
served to have fallen short of what they knew they ought to
 KEbid., p. 105.
2Art., "Sin", o£. cit.. p. 702.
3The Origin and Propagation of Sin f pp. 108-9*
4Ibld., p, 114.
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do. Consequently Tennant claims that his view neither ex- 
cuses evil nor explains it away. That the human heart pro- 
duces great quantities of evil behaviour is an empirical 
fact which he does not deny, and he has no doubt that men 
definitely need redemption and forgiveness of sins. And he 
makes it clear that the universality of sinfulness is suf- 
ficient cause for the redemption of man, regardless of how 
sinfulness arose. To the doctrine of redemption, the ques- 
tion of the origin of sin is of no moment, and Jesus him- 
self never spoke of sin in terms of its origin, but always 
only in terms of its presence and actuality*^
"The worthiest view of the meaning of the Incarnation 
  that which finds in it an absolute and eternal 
purpose of God   utterly transcends all question of ^ 
a Fall, and even the relation of Christ to human sin".
He thinks that the universality of sin has, however, 
its sufficient explanation in the fact of the created animal. 
nature of man, with its strongly implanted propensities which 
though neutral at birth become, by the time of the acqulsl-.. 
tion of conscious volition and morality, powerful drives, the 
overcoming of which Is a life*.long task set for every man* 
The universality of sinfulness is thus seen to be no marvel 
calling for unusual speculative explanation. And its uni- 
versality becomes even more understandable, he claims, when 
it is remembered that
"not only does widening experience bring.increased 
opportunities of sinning and manifold more inducements 
to sin; but every fresh access of insight into the
1Ibid., p. 112. 
2Ibid., p. 152. 
3Ibid., p. 153.
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Inexhaustible content and demand of the Divine claim 
upon the heart and soul and mind and strength reveals 
new worlds within the self to be conquered; and fail- 
ure at any staje is sin".l
This evident sinfulness of men has often, however, been con- 
founded with an idea of original sin. The generality of sin 
is a fact, Tennant acknowledges, but he does not find it 
possible to hold that original sin is other than "an infer- 
ence, an alleged, conjectural, explanation of the facts".
That such a doctrine has been invoked is understandable 
though, he admits, for previous to the rise of evolutionary 
theories and of psychological investigations it was rather 
impossible for theologians to do otherwise than to correlate 
the impressive incidence of sinfulness with the idea of an 
hereditary corruption of a never questioned state of original 
righteousness.
"But for us there has emerged an alternative view of 
man's original condition. What if he were flesh be- 
fore spirit; lawless, impulse -governed organism, ful- 
filling as such the nature necessarily his and there- 
fore the life God willed for him in his earliest age, 
until his moral consciousness was awakened to start 
him, heavily weighted with the inherited load, not, 
indeed, of abnormal and corrupted nature, but of non- 
moral and necessary animal instinct and self-assertive 
tendency, on that race -long struggle of flesh with 
spirit and spirit with flesh". 3
As for scriptural references to the origin of sin, 
Tennant contends that we cannot look there for guidance con- 
cerning the historical beginnings of sin, even if we still 
believed that whatever we find in Scripture is unconditional 
truth. In fact, the conclusions of his lengthy investigation
Concept of Sin, p. 270.
2Art., "Original Sin", p. 564, Encyclopaedia of; Religion
and Ethlos, IX.
^ The Origin and Propagation of Sin, pp. 10-11.
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into The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original 
Siru are not even needed if one accepts the account pre- 
sented by several sciences of the slow development of the 
race from crude and.barely human beginnings* And^ apart 
from the speculative nature of these doctrines, and their 
intrinsic difficulties, Tennant sees too much in the Genesis 
account of
"the echoes of remotely prehistoric thought, elements 
borrowed from the ancient lore of other nations, 
human speculation on matters beyond the reach of 
human memory11 ,
and, in any case, declares it invalid to look there for any 
^ Priori final or permanent truth concerning historical, 
psychological, or scientific problems.
At any rate, the detailed argument of his historical 
survey is not important to the present thesis because there 
are few today who look to the Genesis account for an exact 
revelation of early events* For the most part those who 
hold to the doctrine of original sin do not base it upon 
Genesis, but rather upon the apparent bias toward evil that 
is exhibited in human behaviour. It is assumed that there 
is such a bias and that it is the result of a fall from an 
originally righteous nature, but no one professes to have 
historical knowledge, such as G-enesis appears to offer, as 
to how the fall came about. The invalidity of deducing 
theology and metaphysics from scriptural statements whose 
import has to do with realms that are investigated by the 
various sciences is now Widely recognized; consequently
1IMd., p. 146.
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this survey is not of central importance to this thesis,
i
inasmuch as its chief conclusion, that a historical fall 
of the race in its first parents is not a revealed fact, 
is not nowadays widely or effectively contested*
St. Paul himself does not make clear how Adam's sin 
is connected with mankind's sinfulness, Tennant alleges,
even assuming as possible the view that man was originally
2 
perfectly developed*
The traditional doctrines pf a Fall and Original Sin
Among most contemporary theologians the idea of ori- 
ginal guilt is no longer retained and for this reason 
scarcely needs to be dealt with, but the conception of 
original sin is nevertheless generally held at the present 
time. Here, then* is encountered, Tennant notices*
"the Irreducible residue of the doctrine of the Fall 
and its effect upon the race: the doctrine that men 
are sinful not merely in that they have committed 
sinful acts* formed sinful habits, and established 
sinful characters, but also in the somewhat different 
sense that they Inherit a nature which is rendered 
abnormal through privation, derangement or distur- 
bance, and In which there is a bias towards evil prior 
to all voluntary sinful action*1 .'
The view, according to which the early narratives of 
Genesis embody a record of a primitive revelation, pre- 
served In purity by the Hebrews alone, has completely 
broken down in the light of the.facts of the sciences 
(of modernity)   © £  man's extreme antiquity and rude 
primitive state, the gradual growth of his mental and 
moral nature, the existence of similar records amongst 
other races, whence the Hebrews partly borrowed theirs, 
and whose origin can be naturally accounted for". The 
Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 2?n.
Tennant approvingly quotes in this regard the following 
statement by Jowett, Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans., p. 180: "How slender is the foundation in the 
New Testament for the doctrine of Adam's sin being im- 
puted to his posterity!   two passages in St. Paul at 
most, and these of uncertain Interpretation". Ibid., p.29S 
Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 22. -
5*
Apart from his rejection of the premises of the doc- 
trines of the Pall and of Original Sin* Tennant finds four 
difficulties implicit in a view of corruption through a
fall*
(1) A state of original righteousness must be assumed, 
a view which receives no support from any of the sciences, 
and in fact is contradicted by them* Though Tennant be-
lieves that "what is original cannot be sin, and sin can-
o
not be original", he elsewhere develops at great length,
as was previously shown, the psychology of the rise and 
growth of sin from man's neutral status of neither good- 
ness or badness*
(2) Even granted original righteousness to be a fact, 
it is difficult to conceive the occurrence of a change from 
natural goodness to a sinful state* For if man was created 
morally righteous it is difficult to account for any urge 
sto evil; and if at present actual sin is taken to presuppose 
in us a state of sinfulness, then Tennant wonders why the 
same presupposition would not be true of the first man, i.e«, 
why man's first sin would not imply a sinful state rather 
than one of original righteousness*
Sometimes in recent theology it has been asserted that 
a kind of mysterious pre-mundane fall occurred* But Tennant 
finds it even more impossible to conceive that man, as a 
pure spirit possessing no bodily motivations and no inheri- 
tance of physical drives, could have fallen from a state of
. p. 27.
2 Art., "Original Sin", op. cit.. p. 564. 
3The Origin and Propagation of Sifi. p. 28.
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original righteousness. No motive is assignable for such 
a fall, .and there can be no excuse such as frailty advanced.
"For self-assertion in man as a mundane being, Nature 
.had provided some motive, if no excuse; for self-
assertion in a pure spirit in a cglestial environment
a motive. .« need s to be provided11 *
And those who refer to a pre-mundane fall* Tennant insists, 
must of course assert that each man-fell independently, be~ 
cause it would be completely immoral to assume that one man's 
fall caused the fall of everyone else* And with this recog- 
nition a fall becomes still more inconceivable, it being 
quite impossible to explain why a multitude of individuals 
should without exception go astray:
"That all men, with no organic connexion between them, 
such as the evolutionary explanation indicates, should 
Independently repeat the fall, no single one retaining 
his perfect integrity, which one would think it would 
be as natural to persist in as the straight line in 
which a moving body persists unless acted upon by an 
impressed force, is stupendously difficult to account
In fact, it becomes increasingly .difficult to account for 
the universality of sinfulness accordingly as we ascribe 
perfection to original man.* At any rate, we have no knowl- 
edge concerning such a life, and even if the soul at that 
time possessed moral, volition, such volition must have been 
lost when the soul entered into this life, for psychology 
has not been able to trace volition and conscience back to 
the time of birth* *
., "Recent Theories as to the Cause of Universal 
fulness", p. 503, Expository Times. XXXV. 
2lbid.. p. 505. 
5jbid., p. 505. 
*Ibid. . p. 505. 
5Art., "Sin11 , 0£. cit., p* 703.
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(3) Further, it Is difficult to understand that a 
single sinful act could disarrange the entire nature of 
man and upset his faculties. Certainly human experience 
provides no analogy to such an event.
"The decisive single deeds which, we all know, can 
-determine the after-course of a career and per- 
manently blunt the sensibility of the moral faculty 
are not strictly parallel. For they are always but 
the final outcome and expression of gradually built- 
up character", 1
(4) Finally, he asks, in view of the doubtful possi- 
bility of the transmission of , acquired modifications, how 
could the consequences of the Fall upon the first parents 
be hereditarily transmitted? Actually, Tennant suggests, 
"the doctrine of an Inherited corruption comes dangerously 
near to resolving sin into physical evil" insofar as it 
regards original sin as being propagated by natural genera- 
tion,
Concerning several objections
Tennant *s theory has been objected to on the ground 
that it represents the moral as being a development out of 
the nonmoral. This objection, however, Tennant maintains, 
neglects to distinguish between evolution as preformatlon 
and its consequent unfolding, and the more proper concep- 
tion of evolution as epigenesis. In epigenesis elements 
may be combine^ in such a way
"that the resultant product or evolute now possesses 
properties which neither the internal nor the ex- 
ternal element possesses severally. . . .It can perfectly
Origin and Propagation of Sin, pp. 28-9. 
2Ibld. . p. 38,
5T
well "be the same, and indeed must "be, in the develop- 
ment of the moral out of the nonmoral. The inborn 
impulses are nonmoral,, the incipient will is non- 
moral ized; the fusion of the two to produce an act _ 
contrary to known law is, however a moral evoluteH . A
Again, sometimes it is held that sin is conscious re- 
bellion against God, or even that it is a calculated pref- 
erence for evil simply because it is evil. But Tennant
believes that sin seldom reaches the .level,of deliberate
2
hostility to God, or defiance of His authority, even in
its most advanced stages, and certainly not in its early 
stages. Secondly, he finds it difficult to believe that 
people ever choose evil because it is evil* Evil is cho- 
sen because it seems to be attractive in itselfi
"Evil may be chosen in order to gratify ambition, or 
passion, or revenge, or spite; but it cannot be pre- 
ferred because it is not preferable, persuasive be- 
cause it is dissuasive, attractive because it is re- 
pulsive. ...Evil is Indeed chosen with the knowledge 
that it is evil, and even with full.awareness that 
it will afterward be followed by misery and other 
hateful consequences. But it is then chosen because 
it is for the time being pleasant, satisfying to some 
wants for desires that are immediately engrossing. 
It Isrover chosen because.it is evil, but always in 
spite-of its being evil"*4
Further, it has been said of Dr. Tennant f s theory that 
it minimizes the sinfulness of sin and/or explains it away; 
that, for example, it does not represent sin to be sin, r It 
is Tennant*s contention, however, that what is commonly called 
sinful is not rightly so called, and that it cannot be in- 
cluded under the category of 'sinfulness', nor, for that 
matter, any
lArt., "Recent Theories as to the Cause of Universal Sin- 
fulness", op. cjlt., p. 506.
2The Concept of Sin, p. 255. 
5The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 78. 
Concept of Sin, p. 255.
"conduct which either could not have been other than 
- it was, or at least knew no moral reason why it 
should have been other than it was* If such conduct 
is correctly included under the term sin, then* truly, 
my theory calls sin not-sin* But it is the very ker- 
nel of my argument that such usage of the term.sin is 
incorrect, and rests upon a confusion. It involves, 
in short,, the dominion of the moral law over nonmoral 
agents"*1
And herein lies the reductio ad abaurdanu Tennant says, of 
assigning sin where there is no consciousness.of a moral 
sanction, for it then becomes only logical to extend such
a concept of sin to the inorganic world, to falling rocks*
o
for example, as well as to innocent infants* To an ethi-
cist the sinfulness of an act depends upon whether or not 
the agent was-aware that a moral.standard was being vio- 
lated, and the same act will differ completely to him,, de.- 
pending upon whether it occurred before or after the ae~ 
qulsition of such a standard* On the one hand, it will be 
comparable to the fall of an avalanche, and on the other 
hand, it will be "distinctly and definitely a sin". 5
In fact, Tennant recognizes that the chief question 
in the entire matter is as to the definition of sin:
"Indeed it would seem to be this divergence between 
my critics and myself, as to the proper definition 
of sin, that all the forms of the objection,that I 
have unintentionally explained away, or that my 
theory is Incompatible with essential and funda- 
mental Christian doctrines, are ultimately to be 
traced".4
On his definition of sin, then, Tennant takes his -
rThe Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. xxiii. 
2Ibid., p. xxv. 
3lbid.. p. xxvi. 
., p. xxvin.
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stand. If his definition Is Incorrect, then in a real 
sense he has explained sin away, and there Is still room 
for retaining a view of original sin* But if his defini- 
tion, that sin is what we are accountable,.for, is correct, 
then it cannot be said that he has explained sin away, or 
minimized it, and consequently there cannot be any theory 
of original sin* The definition of sin, then, is the all- 
important question in Tennant's treatment of the nature of 
sin*
Further on, it may be seen that the very means by 
which he substantiates his theodicy, if correct, seems to 
confirm the validity of rejecting theories of original sin. 
He holds that God's chief purpose in the world is to de- 
velop moral personality, this emphasis being the key point 
in his theodicy of both moral,and physical evil* If this 
is so, it appears to reinforce his views on the nature of 
sin, for if God desired ..to develop moral personalities it 
would only have been necessary for Him,to have started men 
on a.level appropriate for a subsequent acquisition and de- 
velopment of moral character. It would have been super*- 
fluous for Him to have created men perfect, ana then to 
have allowed them by themselves to fall to the appropriate 
level* In any case, the significant point now Is the 1m-- 
portance of Tennant's theories concerning sin, at least as 
a background, to his theodicy. To what degree and in what 
ways his theodicy stands or falls with his concept of sin 
will be brought out in a later chapter, as well as, inci- 
dentally, to what extent his theodicy, if taken to be valid, 
contributes to the substantiation of his theory concerning,
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especially, the origin of sin*
It has "been necessary to make the exposition of this 
part oi* Dr. Tennant's thought somewhat lengthier than will 
be the exposition of his theodicy, inasmuch as it is an 
especially unusual position he maintains concerning sin, 
and because more controversy doubtless obtains in this re- 




Tennant recognizes at the outset that the existence 
of evil is obviously a graver problem for theism than for 
other philosophical world-views because of the theistic 
insistence upon the unquestionable goodness of the all- 
powerful will of God*
An empirical theist such as Tennant, who takes his 
start from the evident fact of the presence of evil in the 
world, does not find it possible-to take comfort in resort- 
ing to the idea that evil is illusion and appearance, oc- 
casioned by the Inability of finite persons to see sub 
specie aet ernitat i s» This and kindred suppositions are 
held by him to be actually no explanation of the problem 
at all*
"For, if evil is illusion, the illusion is an evil; 
and if no evil would confront timeless vision, it 
is an evil that we see sub specie temporig"*
And, if we view evil as unreal or illusory, then, says 
Tennant,, we have entirely renounced experience as the
foundation of knowledge, for if there is anything real in
p
our experience it is the actuality of suffering^
He asserts that it is incumbent upon the theist to 
demonstrate that the world does not contain "absolute and 
superfluous evils", and that if the problem of the exis- 
tence of evil can be solved on an intellectual basis, it
^-Philosophical Theology. II- -oV 181-
2The Origin and Propagation o£ Sin, p. 137.
62
will not be necessary to base our hope for the future 
solely on our faith in a divine love whose choice of his- 
torical means may be somewhat beyond our under standing,
In the first chapter some mention was made of Tennant's 
usage of the term 'best possible world 1 . He holds, of 
course, that God is a determinate Being, not an indeter- 
minate Absolute in whom all differences are lost: in that 
God is love, for example, He is not malevolent, and in that 
He has willed a developing moral order, He has not willed a
n
creation of perfected spirits. The nature of the world is 
what it is because God is what He is,^ If God had created, 
a different world, He would be a God different from the one 
we have some revelation of:
"A God who might have 'chosen 1 a different seminal 
world from this, or different 'primary collocations', 
would be a different
We are not to think of ...God as having been confronted with 
various possibilities for worlds, independent of Himself: 
'unrealized possibilities '* in this sense, are *lmpossi~ 
bilities 1 , What is possible for God is determined by His 
nature, not by any prius of law, and His determinateness 
excludes all incompatible so-called possibilities. Actually, 
Tennant claims, the human mind. imagines possibilities in 
abstraction from actualities that it knows, and tends to 
conceive of them as independent of actualities,^
^-philosophical Theology, II, 185*
., "The Problem of the Existence of Moral Evil", p. 82, 
Elements of Pain and Conflict in Human Life. Cambridge 
Lectures,
3philosophlcal Theology, II, p. 184, 
4Ibid,, p, 183, 
5lbid,, p. 183,
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It has "been suggested, Tennant notices, that God. might 
have chosen a different world than this one; He might, for 
example, have chosen one which involved no pains and evils 
for man. But Tennant questions- such a view on the ground 
that it would hardly be compatible with the world being a 
cosmos* and that it would not provide for the realization 
of moral value s,.
Dr. Tennant thinks it a superfluous question to ask 
why God created a world at all, because he means by God, 
the * world -ground*; and he says that it is possible to re- 
ply to the question why an evolutionary world rather than a 
perfected one, by maintaining that if God were to realize
the good he had to create finite spirits amid a world frame-
pwork of evolutionary development. And he asserts that
since theism teaches that the world-ground Is a God of love, 
it must also teach that "in some sense, the world is the 
'best possible 1 of its kind* . Of course, by 'best 1 Tennant 
means instrumentality to the realization of moraj. values, 
rather than mere pleasantness. Happiness may be an impor- 
tant element in the final consummation of things but it is 
not the primary purpose of human activity, and, in fact* 
man at his best has realized this to be true:
"The 'best possible 1 world... the world that is worthiest of God and man, must be a moral order, a theatre of moral life and love".4
And, concerning the term 'possible', Tennant reaffirms
.. p. 184. 
2lbid«. p. 185. 
^Ibid. . p. 186. 
4Ibid., p. 186.
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that it is improper to speak of any griua of independent 
possibilities, and that God having once constituted ac- 
tuality is not to be regarded as having control alike over 
the possible and impossible,
Tennant wishes to make it clear, however, that though
God is of a determinate nature* and, in a sense, is there-
2 
by limited by His very recognition of truths of thought
and being, there was not a time when such laws of thought,
 z
etc., were apart from Him* •* The sum of eternal truth is
"the mode of God's being and activity, and is neither their
- K 
prius nor product". Elsewhere, in fact, Tennant indicates
anxiety to dissociate his theistic view from the deistic 
idea that the world upon being created is self -sufficiently 
maintained, and from the view that the laws of nature are 
to be considered as independent existent s like the ule of 
the Greeks* Rather does he see in these laws the "regu- 
larly but freely acting power of the Governor of the uni- 
verse11 ,^
A corollary of the fact, Tennant holds, that God has 
committed Himself. to a definite plan of action concerning 
the cosmos and man, and which will be brought out more 
clearly further on, is that much that happens in the world 
is of an incidental nature and does not necessarily express
,, p, 187,
2" Such self -limit at ion is to be regarded as itself the outcome of the divine will and not an inner necessity of His own Being and Life", The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 135*             
^Philosophical Theology. II, p, 187, 
4Ibid.. p. 188,
5Essay, "The Being of God, in the Light of Physical 
Science", Cambridge Theological Essays, pp, 96-7,
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His direct purpose. Tennant is careful to emphasize "the 
incidental nature of much that happens in God's world., and 
from which teleological Import is excluded".
Moral Evil
Having affirmed that God must be a determinate being,, 
and be directing a developing moral order, it follows, says 
Tennant, that in such a world there must be the possibility 
and risk of moral evil. If there is to be moral goodness 
in persons, they had to be created capable of sinning, for 
it is only when it is possible for men to go wrong that it 
is also possible for them to grow in character and, develop 
in moral stature. God did not Intend men to be as clocks, 
for goodness which is automatic can not strictly be called 
moral. He intended them to be free agents, with a capacity 
to choose the lower good instead of the higher, so that 
their decisions, when directed to the higher goods of life, 
would be the result of moral freedom rather than the ex- 
cellent behaviour of a puppet or 'sentient automaton1 . The
high point of the best possible world is the moral agent*
2not the puppet.
"It is idle, then, wistfully to contemplate the happi- ness which the world might have known had its creator made us capable only of what is right**.* There is no moral goodness in a clock, however perfectly it may keep time* Freedom to do good alone, except after suppression of lower motives by moral conflict, is not freedom".-5
A best world, then, is comprised of free persons with
1The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 
^Philosophical Theology. II, p. 188. 
3lbid.   PP. 188-9*
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a measure of delegated autonomy* with such freewill* if 
it is genuine, opening the way to new possibilities deter- 
mined in scope "by the degree of conferred freedom. And . 
thus though God created man .with -certain capacities for 
free decision- ana creativity He is not to be viewed, as 
directly responsible for the use made of this freedom. 
Tennant holds that the fundamental motivations toward the 
wrong are inevitable, nonmoral or morally neutral, conse- 
quences of the evolutionary process which God is putting 
men through., but that it is nevertheless conceivable that 
moral evil might not have emerged* Sin is actually the 
result of our freedom, a misuse of that for which we are 
re sponslble . Thus
"for the possibility of moral evil entering into this 
moral order, God, who foreknew it, is responsible: 
He permits, so to say, the evil in order that there 
may be good* But for the actual emergence of man's 
moral evil we cannot say that He is responsible: our 
sin, when 'sin 1 is strictly and correctly defined, is 
not God's act but the product of our volition, or de-
~~ M 1 *
volved freedom".
And, even if it is maintained that because God is the cause 
of those who cause moral evil he is therefore its ultimate 
cause, no further problem is presented, Tennant declares,
for the reason that the highest good which God wills cannot
o
be achieved without the permission of evils along the way.
And it must be remembered, he affirms* that the fulfillment 
of the divine purpose in its entirety may very well involve 
temporary defeats in particular cases,.*
.. p. 189.
2Art., "The Problem of the Existence of Moral Evil", p. 519 
Expository Times, XXX.
and Propagation of Sin, p. 140.
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Some object that* inasmuch as God on the theistic 
theory stamped each soul with specific capacities and ..char- 
acteristics, such a theodicy is invalid, assuming that be- 
cause God created men he also necessarily created all voli- 
tional consequences. According to Tennant, however, this 
objection maintains its force only on the conception that 
the will is a machinelike entity, and disregards, the view 
that man was not foreordained merely to proceed, through a 
specific set of actions* The results of free will-are nei- 
ther the creative acts of God or the mechanically ordered 
functions of man. More properly*
"freewill consists in subjective activities of a 
plastic person, in directivity of assigned capaci- 
ties, etc., in choice and transvaluation, in selec- 
tive distribution of attention such as determines 
the strengths of motives««. lf «
He sees that the possession of freewill, by human beings is 
at onc.e their burden and their glory, their liberty and 
their responsibility, and that they could not have it merely 
the one way or the other, inasmuch as if there is to be 
morality for man there must be struggle and conflict, and 
the opportunity to do moral evil*
He then notices that a strange combination of criti- 
cisms has frequently been leveled at theism in respect to 
the presence of moral and physical evil in the world; 
namely, some object to moral evil on the ground that there 
is too much contingency in the world, and others object to 
physical evil on the ground that there is too much regularity,
IPhilo sophical Theology, II, p. 190. 
2Ibid., p. 190.
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"As they stand, these objections cancel one another;
-and the theist's reply to them is that neither the 
contingency in the human realm nor the uniformity in 
the physical realm is a superfluity^ but both are 
essential condition? of moral life"* 1
To the suggestion that God could or should intervene 
at times to effect a variation in these conditions, Tennant 
again says that, though such Interventions might shelter us 
from temptation and lead to correct conduct, such right- 
ness and correctness would not be of any moral value. The 
growth of morality may not be an unbroken progressive as- 
cension, but for God to force it along such lines would 
amount to a renunciation of the moral plan.* Thus the sup- 
position that the existence or sin is a barrier to theodicy 
must, he contends, ground its objection either upon the idea 
that to God there is no difference between the possible and 
the impossible* or the view that the best possible world IB 
not a moral order but one of 'happiness 1 . And if the moral 
order is the finest and best plan a world can embody, then 
despite any incidental evils, the only means by which the 
best world may be attained is also good. In fact, Tennant 
holds, the theistlc philosophy, by virtue of its emphasis 
upon the realization of moral values, as being the world's 
purpose, 'requires* that the world be an Imperfect, de- 
veloping order rather than a nonmoral static one.
As yet only God's purpose has been considered, but 
Tennant also believes that a theodicy must show that man 
in some sense accepts God's ideal as his own, i.e., man
.. p. 190. 
, P. WO. 
3lbid. . p. 191.
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must recognize and appropriate the ideal as a personal end 
and not acquiesce in it merely because it strives toward a 
goal which is the will of the divine. The will of God must 
be done not simply because it is the will of God, but be- 
cause that will is seen to be the finest ideal man could 
strive for. In fact, Tennant realizes,, men at their best 
have seen the wisdom in the divine plan of growth through 
struggle, have agreed that the prize is worth the cost, and 
in general are glad that they are above the merely brute 
level of nonmorality* This latter emphasis is important 
because he holds that a theodicy must establish.the reason- 
ableness of the view that life is worth the troubles which
we are faced with, and that though we are surely born to
o
trouble, "the glory of living is worth the post". If the
things of the spirit and of moral endeavor are the finest 
things in life, then, Tennant reaffirms, there can be no 
doubt that the best world is one which provides for the ac- 
quisition of those things* Indeed, had mankind never ar- 
rived on the evolutionary scene, and had the world f s pro*- 
cess leveled off before the appearance of rational and moral 
creatures, it is more than.likely that "the world's falling 
short of being a moral order would have remained unregretted 
and unapproved". As long as men can feel, Tennant states, 
that the cost of living nobly and of learning love is in- .,- 
evitable and is not superfluous to a moral order, then they 
can approve of and find Inspiration in God's ideal*
., p. 192.
2Art., "The Problem of Suffering", p. 100, Elements of 
Pain and Conflict in Human Life*
^Philosophical Theology. II, p. 192.
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A theodicy must further show, says Tennant, that moral 
evil is not in the long run unsurmountable or unconquerable* 
It is first noticed by him, in this regard, that the history 
of mankind shows an unmlstakeable trend of moral growth, 
though it is an advance which from time to time has been in- 
terrupted, and if it cannot from this fact be concluded that 
the progress will continue, he asserts, it is also not to be 
supposed that such gains as have thus far been acquired may 
be 'permanently reversed 1 . Tennant rejects several views 
which have been advanced at various times with the inten- 
tion of safeguarding the ultimate victory of good over evil: 
(1) that the contingencies of history are overruled by an 
absolute dialectic process, (2) that progress is inevitable, 
an intrinsic characteristic of the world's process, (2) that 
God will at the proper time reduce all evil and freewill in 
order to preserve the good, (4) that the measure of progress.
/44«^ hen fhuj fa* 6een acfnevc.d /'**tp/sej fisfurf pro*r*ss
and (5) that someday men will lose all desire for the evil. 
After all this is affirmed, however, Tennant yet thinks that 
there are several reasons for believing that evil will not 
ultimately conquer the good.
One reason he finds in the intrinsic natures of good 
and evil themselves, quite independently of contingency and
freedom* Goodness is seen to be characteristically self-
p
conserving, while evil in itself is selffdestroying; and
they possess these intrinsic qualities by virtue of the very 




evil are what they are.^ And, accordingly, the victories 
of evil over good have great difficulty in consolidating 
themselves:
"Evil desires and evil purposes conflict with one 
another, so that evil as well as goodness resists 
and thwarts consplration in evil. On the-other 
hand, conquests in goodness and truth, despite 
their temporary obscuration, when once made are 
made for ever* The world always has knowledge that 
it is the better for them. There is a unity of aim, 
a co-operation in purpose., a solidarity of interest, 
a growing consensus, amongst men of goodwill* The 
moral law, in spite of its continual violation, sur- 
vives and Increases its dominion: the good is self- 
conservative".2
Again, moral goodness is sometimes consequent upon the oc- 
currence of badness, while evil is not produced by goodness* 
There have been many instances in which good results have 
ensued from bad actions, and cases in which good has been 
extracted from a bad situation* even sometimes to the ex- 
tent of transmuting the evil. "Error exposes itself, to 
the further elucidation and definition of the truth: evil, 
in its very acquisition, reveals itself to be the lesser 
good, and learns by bitter experience that it is evil"*-* 
Further, there is the element of social Inheritance* To- 
day's generation profits from the gains and acquisitions at 
moral insight and refinement which have been slowly developed 
during the centuries, and it is not as though each person 
had to begin alone at the bottom to learn and to discipline 
himself, for there is an accumulation of social experience 
which provides wisdom and guidance to the individual; and 
as more and more persons incline toward the good, it
., "Divine Omnipotence", p. 36, Expository Times. XXXI- 
^Philosophical Theology. II, p. 194. 
3Ibid*. p* 194.
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accordingly becomes increasingly difficult for the plans 
of the wicked to be realized*
Then for these reasons it is seen by Tennant that 
casual optimism is not the only view which can claim a 
final victory of the good. And, he surmises, it may even 
be that in the future the rule of goodness will proceed 
with even greater speed., for, in a sense, the rise of the 
good is a cumulative process. At any rate, Tennant states, 
there is no reason why we should believe that moral evil is 
destined to an ultimate triumph over the good, any more than 
there was reason to believe that its existence is incom- 
patible with a moral world*
"The tendencies inherent in goodness and badness, as 
such, preclude the possibility that the purpose of a 
self-limited God, supposing it to include the final 
victory of goodness over evil, should be defeated by 
the freedom of His creatures".2
Some have asked, Tennant acknowledges, whether or not 
moral evil will ever disappear entirely, and if it may not 
always exist even when brought under control. Such a ques- 
tion is not, however, he thinks, of central relevance to a 
theodicy whose theism makes no pretentions to Insight into 
knowledge of the after-life beyond adducing reasons for be- 
lief in such a life. Though theism believ.es that God is 
love, it cannot thereby submit reasons for asserting that 
present history is but a preparation for the final consum- 
mation which will preclude the possibility of anything
3 evil. Indeed, theism is not required to affirm any of the
1Ibld., p. 195. 
2Ibid., p. 195. 
3lbid., p. 195.
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doctrines of universal hope, Individual perfection, or 
ultimate destruction of the unrighteous, in preference to 
each other. And even if there should be continued active 
conflict of good and evil in the next world, theism is not 
thereby faced with a difficulty more burdensome than the 
presence of moral evil in this world*
Then again, he recognizes, some have taken to the 
other extreme in holding that., the fullest use of the divine 
love will forever require the continued existence of, sinful 
creatures, with reality in this conception being forever 
characterized by the overcoming of evil. Unlike the former 
notion, this view is seen to represent a prejudice against 
the changeless and perfected, and to appreciate the process 
and progress rather than a conceivable goal* However, 
Tennant, thinks that such an alternative is scarcely de- 
manded by the conclusion that the realization of a moral 
world includes at least the possibility if not the actu<- 
ality of evil, for it may be, he says, that the maintenance 
and furtherance of goodness in a future world is not in any 
way dependent upon the existence of evil* Indeed, human 
experience furnishes an illustration to the contrary in what 
has been called 'the saint's rest 1 , or "the relative freedom 
from moral conflict and from temptation, earned by self-- 
discipline and struggle", and this rest may then have an 
abiding value and satisfaction of its own quite apart from 
whether or not the conditions which first provoked and 
stimulated it are maintained* In any case, Tennant expects
., p. 196. 
2Ibid. , p. 196.
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that both these speculations will readily "be seen to be 
irrelevant to the main tasks of theodicy*
Thus the problem of evil in its aspect of moral evil 
must, he insists, be confronted with the philosophy that 
in this 'best possible 1 world all things, seen not in each 
particular, but as a whole, work together for the greatest 
good* Tennant does not wish to maintain that everything 
that happens is good* or that things are good simply, be- 
cause they happen* or that evil Is any the less evil be- 
cause it serves a good purpose in the world as a- whole* 
And he is eager to discredit the assumption that all par*- 
ticular evils occur toward some particular good, or are as 
musical .dissonances in the harmony of the whole*
"When it is asserted that all things work together 
.for good, by 'all things' is not meant each and every 
single thing, but the sum of things regarded as one ~ 
whole or complex, the universe as a coherent order"  
Tennant believes that this theodicy concerning moral 
evil is the natural outcome of the doctrine of sin which he 
maintains, though, to be sure* not necessarily a view de- 
veloping alone from his theory of sin, and only hopes that 
the theodicy is a further vindication of his theory of
Physical Evil
The above quoted general view is taken by Tennant to 
be the most appropriate context for the facing of that as- 
pect of the problem of evil which cannot safely be attri^ 
buted to the responsible actions of human freedom*
.. P* 197. 
2 Ibid, , p. 197.
Origin and Propagation orf Sin* p. 141,
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physical evil, the sufferings of sentient beings brought 
about by the processes of nature*
The resolution of the oft-stated puazle as to the 
power and goodness of God seemingly working at cross pur- 
poses does not, Tennant thinks, need to involve a demon- 
stration that every particular painful instance that occurs 
in the world is the means to a particular end* or to some 
providential purpose* Indeed, such a procedure is held to 
be "both superfluous and insufficient11 * 1 It is to a cer- 
tain extent true, he thinks, to say that pain is "sometimes 
stimulating, educational, preventitive, or remedial", but 
such affirmations do not cover the entire problem* And it 
is only of slight help to argue that we sometimes exag- 
gerate our pains* Then again it is clear that differences 
in the intensity of pleasures is sufficient to make one 
pleasure more appreciated than another, without recourse 
to the view that pain makes pleasure more enjoyable* And 
all such particular instances as illustrated in the state- 
ment that the knife is necessary to cure the disease are 
seen only to touch the edge of the problem when one asks 
about the necessity of the disease. Thus, the essential 
problem is deeper than these particular instances and 
situations indicate* Tennant, in fact, believes that 
theism must demonstrate
"that pain is either a necessary by-product of an 
order of things requisite for the emergence of the 
higher goods, or an essential instrument to organic 
evolution, or both"*2
Philosophical Theology* II. p. 197.
2-n-^/} n 10«2Ibid*, p. 198*
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And unless it can "be shown that this is the case with pain 
and suffering, it cannot reasonably be held, he maintains, 
that the world is not poorly arranged and clumsily managed* 
Thus it is seen that Tennant maintains that it is necessary 
to show that the non-existence of pain would "be incongruous 
with the nature of God, inasmuch as suffering is the natural 
result of a developing moral order, God's "best possible 
world,1 that, in fact, it must be established that suffering 
is a 'logically necessary 1 outcome of an order aiming at 
moral development.
The latter alternative, that pain is an essential in- 
strument to organic evolution, appears to Tennant to be es- 
pecially relevant to the question of the lower animals. 
Their suffering is not incidental to the evolutionary pro- 
cess but materially aids organic process, and
"it renders unnecessary a large amount of inheritance 
of specialised structure and function, and so pre- 
vents the suppression of plasticity; and, as the 
'sensitive edge* turned towards danger, or as pro- 
phylactic, it Is of value for organic progressive- 
ness. Although evil, it is also good for something",5
The former alternative, that pain is a necessary 'by- 
product 1 , will have to be Invoked, he thinks, In order to 
explain that dimension of human suffering which so often 
appears to serve no good purpose; for some men have it In 
them to meet suffering patiently and courageously, and they 
will not be better men for having done so. And it would be 
a crude Divinity, Tennant contends, who would appoint them
., "The Problem of Pain and Suffering", p. 
Expository Times. XXX,
2Art., "The Problem of Suffering", o£. olt., p. 100< 
3philosophical Theology. II, p, 199.
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sufferings merely In order to convert their potentialities 
into actualities* He argues that suffering Is an inevitable 
accompaniment to a developing moral order, a necessary 
though incidental outcome of a determinate world which 
exists as a habitation for rational and moral life,, and 
maintains that the problem of physical evil will be solved 
if it can be demonstrated that the suffering which we ex- 
perience is not superfluous to the determinate cosmos, even 
though it may seem that specific pains are often out of pro- 
portion to any particular purposes we can conceive might be 
fulfilled by them*
The regularity of nature Tennant holds to be the point 
of departure for meeting this problem* for he thinks that 
if the world is to be a moral order it must be an order 
chiefly characterized by regularity and law-abidingness,
this law-abidingness being an indispensable precondition
o
to a realm suitable for moral life. It is, in fact, be-
cause of physical regularity that it is possible for man 
to make predictions, to plan, to reflect, to form habits* 
to accumulate experience, and to develop character and in- 
tellectual faculties* These remarks will perhaps readily 
be granted, Tennant observes, but he believes that they 
have often been neglected in considerations of the problem 
of suffering. In emphasizing, then, the framework of a 
rational cosmos as a setting for the development of mor- 
rallty, the uniformity of law being Indispensable, that is,
. , p. 199. 
2Ibid., p. 199.
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once granting the necessity of a constant world as the 
only suitable place for moral growth, it is improper, 
Tennant stresses, to expect particular situations to 
yield consequences incongruous with the general pattern 
of events. The reign of law, even though it entails suf- 
fering, inasmuch as "we cannot have the advantages of a 
determinate order of things without its logically or its 
causally necessary disadvantages", is necessary if the 
highest goods in life are to be realized. And though 
we may not be able to assign any particular purpose to 
earthquakes and pestilence, they are nevertheless prod- 
ucts of the same system of things which on the whole is
o
suitable to the maintenance of life and health.
Any particular disadvantages which accrue are not to 
be considered as the direct will of God, Tennant says, but 
are to be regarded as inevitable concomitants of the gen- 
eral plan. God's will operates in respect to these par- 
ticular events antecedently, but not consequently, i.e., 
they are not in themselves desired, but are permitted be- 
cause the antecedently willed moral order could not have 
been had without them.3
In order to will a moral order God had to commit him- 
self to a determinate plan of procedure, thus at once rul- 
ing out other possible methods. At this point, Tennant 
approvingly quotes Martineau in regard to the latter*s 
conception of a cosmic equation which entails the consequent
, p. 200.
2Essay, "The Being of God, in the Light of Physical 
Science", pjo. clt., p. 96.
^Philosophical Theology. II, p. 200.
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working out of results compatible only with the values of 
its roots,1 then proceeds to elaborate this idea:
"If two consequences follow from a system of propo.- 
sitions, or two physical properties are involved in 
a configuration of particles, we cannot have the one 
without the other, though the one may be pleasing or 
beneficial to man and the other may be painful, or 
in its immediate effects hurtful. And such a result 
by no means implies lack of benevolence or of power 
on the part of the Creator, so long as power does not 
Include inconsistency or indeterminateness. It sim- 
ply bespeaks the inexorableness of logic, the com- 
patibility of things, and the self-consistency of 
the Supreme Being11 . 2
Tennant adduces the example of water (its capacity to 
drown us as well as to benefit us) in this connection. Its 
specific gravity, freezing-point, thirst-quenching and 
cleansing functions, are all necessary constituent parts 
of it. Water cannot have only the one set of qualities, 
and therefore it is impossible to have water which will 
only be of benefit to men, or to have removed the quali- 
ties that are sometimes detrimental* Determinateness of 
nature excludes certain associations of elements, and in- 
cludes others, and we cannot have it only one way. Thus, 
physical ills and goods both result from the determinate 
plan which seeks an appropriate setting for intelligent 
and moral life. That there could be a determinate world 
providing at once for the comfort of man and for his edu- 
cation and growth in morality Is a view which Tennant leaves 
to the objectors to theism to demonstrate.
This being true, it must then follow, Tennant claims,
1rbid.. p. 201- 
2lbid.. p. 201, 
3Tbld.. p. 201.
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that any particular evils which thus occur cannot be con- 
sidered 'absolute or superfluous'. These evils are not 
aosolute inasmuch as they are subservient to an order which 
Is good for the development of moral personality, and they 
are not superfluous inasmuch as they are Inevitable inci- 
dents to that order. They Issue from a system which, re- 
garded as a whole, ministers to the highest good* To be 
sure, they are not good from the hedonic standpoint, but
they are good from the standpoint of a higher conception
o
of the good. It is, in fact, Tennant recognizes, pre- 
cisely from the hedonistic viewpoint that the many indict- 
ments of the world as bad spring*^
And to the suggestion that God could or should inter- 
fere with the process, Tennant rejoins that as God could 
hardly fashion moral beings without making them free and 
subject to temptations, so he could scarcely have ordained 
a moral order which was not at the same time a physical 
order* And only by foregoing the determinate world-plan 
and its moral order and regularity could God prevent such 
consequences as earthquakes and pestilence. Some changes 
might conceivably be made without renouncing the cosmos, 
but nothing to the degree which would be required for the 
suspension of suffering In general?
"Physical evil, then, must necessarily be. And the 
goodness of God is vindicated If there be no reason 
to believe that the world-process involves more 
misery than Nature's uniformity entails, 11 ^
3-Ibld.. P. 201.
2Ibld.. p. 202.
3Art., "The Problem of Pain and Suffering", OJD. oit.. p. 473-
^Philosophical Theology. II, p. 202.
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Elsewhere Tennant summarizes that the absence of these 
evils from M a world such as ours11 is an impossibility in 
two respects: (1) it would be incompatible with physical 
order, and therefore (2) incompatible with the production 
and maintenance of reason and morality«*
Tennant strongly maintains, however, that this the- 
odicy does not suppose that every particular pain.is the 
directly purposed will of God, or that any of the specific 
forms of suffering thrust on man such as tetanus and can- 
cer are antecedently willed by God as means to particular 
ends* Indeed many pains are seen by him to be obviously 
out of proportion to the human situations, in which they 
occur, and holds that it is impossible upon observation of 
sufferings and circumstances to retain the view of provi- 
dence which regards suffering in each case to be relevant
o
to a specific purpose or need. A long quotation is here
given because of its masterful summarization of the most 
important difficulties involved in the problem of evil:
M It can be admitted that excruciating pains are more 
, severe than they need be for evoking virtues such as 
patience and fortitude, and that to assign them to 
God's antecedent will would be to attribute devil- 
ishness to the Deity. Moreover, the fact that some 
human beings are born as abortions, as imbecile or 
insane, seems to be inexplicable on the view that 
every form of suffering is a particular providence, 
or an antecedently willed dispensation for educating 
and spiritually perfecting the person on whom the 
affliction falls; while to suppose that suffering is 
inflicted on one person for the,spiritual edification 
of another is again to conceive of God as immoral^ 
But the hardest fact of all for human equanimity, in 
presence of physical and mental evil, is that the ap- 
portionment of suffering among individuals is en- 
tirely irreconcilable by us with any divine plan of
IArt.» "The Problem of Suffering". op. clt.. P. 107. 
^Philosophical Theology;. II, p. 203,
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adjustment of particular afflictions to the parti- 
cular needs, circumstances, and stages of moral de- 
velopment, of individual sufferers* Even more dis<- 
tressing to human thought than the goading intensity 
of some kinds of pain is the seemingly chaotic dis- 
tribution of human ills. If we could trace the 
utility of particular sufferings with their varying 
degrees of ©ndurableness, or discern any adaptation 
of pain to the person's sensibility, moral state, 
and need of awakening.or chastening, then philosophy 
might be able to agree with the simple-minded piety 
which assigns a special purpose to every instance of 
suffering, and finds therein the visitation or ap- 
pointment of an all-wise and all-good God* But the 
wind is not tempered to the shorn lamb; the fieriest 
trials often overtake those who least need torments 
to inspire fear, to evoke repentance, or to perfect 
patience, and also those who, through no fault of 
their own, lack the mature religious faith and moral 
experience by which alone they could understand how 
afflictions may be endured for their souls 1 good11 *
And in concluding these observations Tennant approves the 
view that 'all things come alike to all: there is one 
event to the righteous and to the wicked', regardless of 
whether or not they will be able to profit by the trial«^ 
And, he believes, such facts cannot be incorporated 
into philosophical systems which hold to a degree of im- 
manence extremer than that of the theism which recognizes 
a measure of autonomy in the created world*-' In this 'wider 
theodicy/, much of human suffering is regarded not as being 
directly willed by God for its own sake or for any purpose, 
but as an inevitable incidental 'by-product 1 of the regu- 
larity of the physical world*
"The world is none the less God's world for its cal- 
lousness to man; but its autonomy, not the particu- 
lar incidence of each single ill, is what the.reli- 






In regard to his theodicy in general Tennant thinks 
that it is more correct to view a great deal of what hap- 
pens in the world as 'incidental 1 rather than 'teleologl- 
cal*. He holds to this distinction because he believes 
that "if every physical happening is directly caused by 
God and reveals his nature, that nature cannot be benevo- 
lent".2
Another primary recognition in Tennant f s theodicy is 
that man is at least an end in himself,. Man, he avows, 
does not have to regard his sufferings merely as a means 
to the ultimate fulfillment of history, or the perfecting 
of the race, or to the realization of some divine purpose > 
or the manifestation of the 'glory 1 of God. The suffer- 
ings which each individual undergoes are justifiable only 
upon the consideration that any long-run benefits which 
may ensue belong to the individual himself, not merely to 
humanity, or God. Fortunately, Dr. Tennant notices, many 
have come to see the relevance of the divine plan to their 
lives and aspirations* and thus share God's ideal as a 
personal ideal. At any rate, we must feel that God is not 
only fulfilling us for Himself but also individually for 
ourselves, for it is only this that gives full meaning and 
worthwhileness to life. If the Individual's sufferings 
remain uncompensated for, or are not Justified by the end 
result, even though the world be the best possible for 
humanity in general or for God, those sufferings "will for
 ' The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 
^Philosophical Theology, II, p. 214. 
3lbid. . P. 204.
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ever be a blot on the whole plan of the universe" : there 
must be a balance of the good over the evil in each life, 
regardless of whether the good in general outweighs the 
evil, if the individual is an end in himself rather than 
a mere means to some other end.
The doctrine of immortality, inevitable to a theory 
of divine love, is seen by him to give a new perspective 
to the problem of evil. The doctrine does not of course 
thereby assert that man's sufferings in this world are any 
the less evil because of some future compensation, but It 
affirms that worldly calamities take on a different aspect 
when viewed from the standpoint that this world is but the 
beginning of the way for mankind* Like St. Paul, Tennant 
is convinced that 'the sufferings of this present time are 
not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be re- 
vealed*   This life has a certain intrinsic value and 
worthwhileness in Itself, and is not merely something to 
be compensated for in a future life. Thus Tennant 's theism 
and theodicy affirm that even in this life with all its ills 
we can see something of the purpose of God as being moti- 
vated by love, and consequently we do not merely have to 
resign ourselves to present sufferings, or to refrain from
criticizing them, Just because there is a future life which
2
will square everything.
Tennant sees a further difficulty for a theodicy that 
builds upon the foundation of the Christian faith* The 
fact that faith itself can be tried needs to be explained,
*. "The Problem of Suffering", op. clt.. P. 
2phllo sophical Theology . II, p. 205.
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he thinks, to those who see in this event another aspect 
of the problem of evil* In view of the small amount of 
definite knowledge which man has of the ways of God, that 
faith itself   the very means by which man can feel him- 
self to be in close relationship with t^e Divine, and 
which must be steady and constant if h* is to cope suc- 
cessfully with life and to produce effective service, not 
to mention its importance in maintaining peace of mind   
is tried by God is exceedingly confounding to some* The 
excellent qualities of human life are not easy to acquire 
even when faith is unclouded, and therefore that this one 
means to heavenly light may be jeopardized by many of the
events and influences which occur seems to many to be Ir-
1 
reconcilable with the theistic conception of God*
Of course, Tennant notices, the nature of faith it- 
self, in that it is not sight, supplies the trial, es- 
pecially in times when increasing scientific and ethical 
knowledge clears away beliefs once Indisputably held as 
certainties and now recognized to be invalid. Thus the 
difficulty involved in this discussion is seen to be es- 
sentially the question, why, if God's purpose is communion 
between his creation and Himself, is not knowledge rather
9than faith allowed us?c
Two points are made by him with respect to this dif- 
ficulty. First, if the genuineness of human freedom, and 
the reality of the quest for truth is to be maintained, 
God will not impinge upon mankind too closely, or allow a
, P« 206+ 
2Ibid. . p. 207.
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possibility of direct vision of Himself. As he had con- 
cluded that too much attraction in goodness would falsify 
the ethical freedom of man, he likewise holds that too 
much vouchsafed knowledge of God would eliminate the need 
for searching out the divine mysteries:
"The formation (as contrasted with the fruition) of 
character, and the winning of truth by truth-seeking 
(as contrasted with the passive imbibing of ready- 
made infallibilities), require an Invisible rather 
than a visible or demonstrable God, a partial re- 
velation rather than a beatific vision, a divine co- 
operation rather than a divine overwhelming".^
Further, Tennant thinks that it must also be remem- 
bered in this connection that this world far from exhaust* 
ing our life only begins it, and that this is Important to 
remember because it throws new light on our failures in 
this world. What we fall to accomplish here becomes com- 
paratively insignificant, especially if God Is more con- 
cerned with what we do with what we have* than as to how 
much we achieve. The achievements and defeats.of this life 
must be seen from the perspective of a beyond, instead of
as sui generis absolute, for it is with growth that God Is
o
primarily concerned rather than with ready-made perfections.
"All aspiration that is here unrealized, all tasks re- 
maining unaccomplished when death cuts us off, all 
baffled search, honest doubt, and faith that has been 
shipwrecked while men of goodwill and pure heart have 
worked In half-light or shadow, may be fulfilled In 
the life beyond"*-7
And so Tennant deals with this problem similarly as 
with the problem of evil in general. That faith must




necessarily "be tried, even though if just for the here 
and now, is not to say that it is thereby less a trial, 
any more than that evil is to be regarded as less evil 
because it is necessary now* And when is coupled the 
remembrance that this life is not the whole of eternity, 
with the recognition that the purpose of the world would 
not be truly ethical if this were the only life, Tennant 
thinks that this puzzle concerning the trial of faith may 
be resolved*
"The facts which suggest a theistic interpretation 
of the world also suggest that in this life our 
seeking rather than our finding is God's purpose 
for us: question and counter-question, intercourse 
and dialogue, rather than full ligfrt and certain 
knowledge. The risks attending faith are not fatal, 
while they are conditions of the ethic o -religious 
status in the life that now lsw »
Thus, Tennant, in his theodicy as a whole, claims 
that though the problem of evil exists primarily if not 
solely for theism which believes God to be at once all- 
powerful and good, theism is the only view which turns 
the problem around and actually assigns a meaning to the 
sufferings of this time.^ They are not merely unfortunate 
events which have to be patiently borne, or for which we 
can see no reason, but they are parts of a general system 
whose main purpose is to contribute to the formation of 
morality and character*
In view of these affirmations and his general treat- 
ment of evil as being what it is because the nature of the 
world is what it is, and the world what it is because God
2Ibid. , p. 181.
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is what He Is, It seems strange to find Tennant make the 
statement in a Journal book review that M an adequate and 
ultimate. ..'rigid philosophic,1 , solution of the problem 
of evil is impossible". In any case, he does not even 
in this context elaborate upon this statement, and does 
not imply it elsewhere in his treatment of theodicy.
It may be possible, however, to show in a further 
chapter that such is actually the case with the problem 
of evil, and that it is not quite necessary or desirable 
to make physical evil an inevitable by-product of a cer­ 
tain given cosmos; but that God is in no sense merely re­ 
signed to the natural law he has created, and actually 
desires it for our own good. In the latter case, what 
we now call evil is rather something we do not understand 
than something God could not, in its excesses, prevent, 
if He was to have a world suitable for the rise and growth 
of moral character.
—————————————————————————————————— 
^Journal of Theological StudiejS. XXI, p. 360.
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Chapter IV; Criticism of Tennant f s Views on Sin
Dr. Tennant*s view concerning the origin of sin has 
been criticized by several as making sin merely an evo­ 
lutionary carry-over, the result of the survival in us of 
animal impulses and appetites which were onoe useful to 
the lower creatures. And it has been felt that in doing 
so Tennant has reduced sin to an evolutionary anachronism, 
thereby to a degree excusing it*
This objection, however, does not strike the center 
of the problem, for Tennant strongly emphasizes that 
though sin is partially made possible by virtue of the 
existence of these impulses and appetites which, to be 
sure, we have inherited from the animals, our physical 
constitutions are what they are because God has so or­ 
dained them. According to Tennant, God planned that men 
should develop from the animals, and that we should have 
a physical nature largely continuous with theirs, with 
strong urges and Impulses imbedded in our nature. Thus, 
this animal-like inheritance or product of the evolution­ 
ary scheme is not undesired, but is part of the ordained 
process*
Actually, it is not essential to Tennant*s views 
concerning sin for him to make this emphasis about our 
physical relationship with the lower animals, because even 
though he firmly holds that God desired men to begin life 
with certain Impulses and appetites, thus providing one 
element In the field of conflict necessary to the growth 
of character, whether or not our nature came about by
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evolutionary development or not does not matter* The im­ 
portant point to notice in his thought is that our physical 
nature is what it is because God planned it that way. That 
He also planned it to be continuous with that of the ani­ 
mals is a belief of Tennant's, but one which whether true 
or not does not affect the validity of his view concerning 
the origin of sin.
Another objection which has been made to Tennant's 
theories is that he has unintentionally minimized and/or 
explained away the sinfulness of sin* Some mention was 
made of this at the close of Chapter II, and of Tennant's 
handling of this objection* That he has dealt with it 
fairly and adequately is difficult to deny, and Impossible 
to deny if his conception of what actually constitutes sin 
is true* And it will be clear by now that if men are only 
sinful in respect to that for which they are accountable 
or responsible, then Tennant has not minimized sinfulness 
or explained It away*
Suffice it to add at this juncture that, in any case., 
he has not minimized the obvious sinfulness of much of the 
conduct of adults. Whether or not his views of either the 
definition of sin or the origin of sin are true, it cannot 
be said that he has minimized adult sin, though, to be 
sure, he has reduced the scope of sinfulness to account­ 
ability. In fact, his views scarcely touch this aspect of 
sin. pennant's great contribution in this field has been 
in his thought concerning the conduct of infants* He has 
thrown a different light on this aspect of the question,
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refusing to hold, from the point of view of psychology, 
that any infant sins or comes into the world sinning, or 
has a tendency to what is objectively regarded as wrong 
conduct that overwhelmingly outwelgfts a tendency to good­ 
ness* Infants, he holds, cannot sin, strictly speaking, 
until they become aware of what they are doing*^ That a 
certain portion of their conduct is not perhaps angelic 
cannot at this stage, he maintains, be called sin* And 
in this sense alone, but only if his view of sin in gen­ 
eral is regarded as incorrect, can he be said to minimize 
sin. As for adults he is quite certain that all, who have 
been observed, have come short of the best that they knew 
to do and were able to do, and consequently stand in need 
of redemption.
Certainly no person can feel himself to be a better 
man than he formerly was, merely because he accepts Tennant's 
views on sin, though he is entitled to realize under 
Tennant's view, which reduces the scope of sin but not the 
intensity of what is actually sinful, that God does not re­ 
gard him as sinful beyond the bounds of that for which he 
is responsible* In the long run, this is all Tennant's 
theories on sin claim, or change in the traditional doc­ 
trine of sin: that man is sinful only in those respects 
for which he Is accountable, and consequently, because the 
infant is for some time not accountable for anything, there
« Hobbes, Leviathan, Oh. XIII: M The desires, and 
other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No 
more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, 
till they know a law that forbids them."
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is no such entity as original sin. He believes that in 
this view nothing essential is lost to Christian doctrine; 
and that his view is in accordance with psychological and 
ethical knowledge, in contrast with other views of sin, is, 
he thinks, a gain to Christianity,
Tennant's work on the nature of sin can scarcely be 
criticized from the viewpoint of the method of empiricism 
which he faithfully employs. What John Oman has said about 
Tennant's philosophy in general, that "his reasoning from 
his own point of view is able,and sound", may also be said 
in regard to his use of psychology, where "he has made him­ 
self a master", and his treatment of sin. He has handled 
the facts of child psychology thoroughly and has found no 
possibility of holding to psychology and to a definition 
of sin or view of its origin other than the one which he 
has championed* And it is difficult to find any inconsis.- 
tency in his work in this field especially since the con­ 
clusion is so simple and unambiguous*
However, though it is rather impossible to demur to 
his conclusions from his empirical standpoint, it may be 
possible to do so from another standpoint, for example, 
the a priori one, which allows for truths of revelation 
and discernment that may be above reason, in which case 
it would be possible to retain the traditional emphases 
concerning sin. If his view of sin is to be criticized 
or rejected, it must be done from some a priori point of 
view*
1Journal of Theological Studies. XXI, p, 407.
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If Tennant*s definition of sin is correct, it has 
been stated, there can be no view of original sin, for 
if man is sinful only in regard to wrong conduct "that he 
is responsible for, then he does not come into existence 
with original sin a constituent element of his nature. 
To adopt Tennant*s definition of sin, and yet desire to 
retain a view of original sin would, then, be an incon­ 
sistent procedure.
And even if it could be demonstrated, that children 
come into the world with a disproportionate tendency to 
badness (that in their infantile stage they do objectively 
bad as well as good things no one denies), it cannot be 
held, Tennant thinks, that they are responsible for their 
inherited nature. And certainly he is right from an em­ 
pirical standpoint. But that children are in general 
more evil than good, though it has often been assumed,, 
has as yet scarcely been demonstrated. That adults are 
great sinners is a fact, but one which in no way compels 
an Inference of original sin. It has, of course, been 
brought out in the expository chapter how Tennant ac­ 
counts for the universality of sin. That life has not 
been made easy for man and that he had to be made free 
and capable of sinning if he was ever to develop morality 
and character has, I think, been sufficiently indicated 
by Tennant in his theodicy, and consequently the univer­ 
sality of slnfulness needs no further explanation.
Again, however., it may be that there is in this case 
a truth above reason: for example, that his definition
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of sin is correct, and at the same time that the doctrine 
of original sin is true. Or, it may be that though it is 
difficult to explain how man can be sinful in regard to 
conduct which is beyond his control and for which he is 
not responsible, he somehow nevertheless is.
At any rate, though it is not easy to find fault with 
his definition of sin, or with his rejection of original 
sin, on the level of empirical method and the attempt to 
explain things entirely in terms of human understanding, 
his views concerning the nature of sin have not, been widely 
accepted in Christian theology. Though the view of ori­ 
ginal guilt has lost favour in contemporary theology, the 
doctrine of original sin still predominantly obtains. 
Somehow, it is felt, man is not what God intended him to 
be, and with this recognition is usually associated a view 
of original sin as being the explanation of this obvious 
fact. Termant himself, to be sure, recognizes a certain 
sense in which man is not doing what he knows he is able 
to do.
•'•John Bennett in his Social Salvation (1935) endorsed 
Tennant's 'ethical 1 definition of sin, yet, later, in 
his Christian Realism (1941) adopted the more traditional 
'theological 1 definition. This change he attributes to 
three reasons: (1) his growing desire to adhere more 
closely to the general tradition of the church, (2) a 
feeling that the ethical definition tends to fall to 
recognize sin, and (3) the recognition that Tennant's 
definition lends itself too easily to the view that-there 
never really is a deliberate choice of evil. 
American theology in general has not adopted Tennant's 
views of sin, but rather may be said to be working along 
the lines of 'realism 1 , I.e., the theological definition 
of sin with its paradox that the greater the sin, con­ 
ceived In terms of its difference to the standard of 
righteousness, the less the sin, viewed from the stand­ 
point of responsibility.
95
"Man's condition denotes, on our theory of Sin, a 
fall from the divine intention; a parody of God's 
purpose in human history, though not a fall from 
an actual state of human righteousness".^-
Thus, the difference "between Tennant and the main stream 
of contemporary theology is at the point of his rejection 
of original sin and its presupposed state of original 
righteousness, as all are at agreement as to man's falling 
short of what he ought to be.
It is in this context, then, that Tennant affirms that 
it has not been sufficiently recognized that God may have 
wanted man to begin at the bottom of the ladder, so to 
speak, and thereafter to climb. The doctrine of original 
sin presupposes, of course, a view of original righteous­ 
ness, because it is generally believed that God would not 
have created original sin or a bias toward evil. But aside 
from the difficulties of a view of original righteousness 
which he has pointed out, and its untenabllity from the em­ 
pirical explanatory standpoint, the view of a fall from 
original righteousness has to overlook the possibility that 
God may have Intended man to begin at the bottom and grow 
in character, thereby achieving morality, God's highest pur­ 
pose for man.
It is, then, difficult to see the necessity for the 
view of a fall from original righteousness. The doctrine 
can only be justified if it is required to solve a funda­ 
mental problem In Christian theology, or if it stands in 
vital relationship to any indispensable Christian doctrine.
3-The Origin and Propagation oJEL sin T p. 134.
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The fact that man needs redemption would not be relevant 
here, Tennant points out emphatically, because redemption 
is required only because of man ! s sinfulness, not because 
people might be originally sinful. The existence alone 
of sin, aside from its origin, is the sufficient cause for 
redemption*
The important question, then, must be concerned with 
what is gained by holding to the view of original sin, and 
with what would be lost if the view were discarded. This 
is a question of a speculative type, of course, but is 
nevertheless a valid one., and the only way to approach the 
problem unless some flaw is exposed in Tennant f s applica­ 
tion of the empirical method to the problem of sin.
Further, to hold to original sin is only possible if 
one identifies sin with some conduct for which man is not 
responsible, or else if one makes God responsible for ori­ 
ginal sin. The word sin is usually used to include some 
conduct which is unavoidable, but it would seem better to 
reserve the term only for conduct for which man is respon­ 
sible. The important thing is that it is not necessary to 
hold that man fell, for this is a purely speculative con­ 
ception having no ground in experience, aside from its 
being contradictory to several sciences, and it is not a 
view necessary to account for the universality of sin, 
from the point of view of psychology. Nor does one honour 
God in making man, individually or collectively, responsi­ 
ble for a supposed event about which he knows nothing and
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remembers nothing. The view of original sin certainly 
does not appreciate the conception that God intended man 
to grow In ethical perfection and to develop character^ 
rather than be ready-made perfect, a finished product from 
the start. 1 And if God so willed man to so develop, from 
the ground up, then it seems fantastic to assume that He 
created man perfect, allowed him to fall, thereby placing 
the responsibility for sin entirely on man's shoulders., 
and then allowed him to grow in stature, thereby fulfill­ 
ing His original purpose for man.
Though Tennant's conception of sin might at first 
sight seem to minimize the sinfulness of sin, it actually 
helps to strengthen the doctrine for the practical pur­ 
poses of Christianity. One reason for the contemporary 
widespread disregard of the Church 1 s teachings about sin 
is the exaggerated and unreal emphasis placed upon it,. 
The usual ecclesiastical teaching has not found a place 
in the thought of most of the ordinary people of today 
partially because of its exaggerated nature. It is dif­ 
ficult for people to understand how they can be considered 
sinful for things which they know they are not responsible 
for, or how they can be considered partakers ill original 
sin when they do not understand how such a thing could be, 
and it is especially mysterious to them how they can be 
considered to be deliberately rebelling against God es­ 
pecially while in an infantile stage. The Church has long
The Master of Ballantrae. Stevenson has McKellar say, 
"For He who shall pass Judgment on the records of our 
life is the same that formed us in frailty".
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been In.need of a simple, consistent, understandable theory 
of sin, and it would appear that Dr. Tennant has made this 
available. His theory is realistic, unexaggerated, and 
quite easy to understand, and at the same time it does not 
give people any cause for relaxing in the moral struggle or 
for regarding themselves as not so bad after all*
It would of course be possible, even after dissocia­ 
ting the term original sin from the ideas of original 
righteousness and a fall, to use it as a symbol or the ob­ 
served slnfulness of man.
Tennant notices that the human mind has by and large 
clung tenaciously to the view of
"an original state, if not of any thing like perfec­ 
tion, yet of unsullied goodness or conscious moral 
Innocence; and it does so because it vaguely feels 
it derogatory to the Holiness of God to attrioute 
any other kind of human nature to His direct causa­ tion1'; 1
but he believes that God chose to shape man from humble 
and neutral origins, and created man with a capacity for 
both goodness and badness, without a pronounced tendency 
to either over the other. That he also believes that God 
has employed the evolutionary means for doing this is not 
important to his theory, because, in either case, he in­ 
sists that God directly willed the physical nature of man. 
His theodicy of moral evil is that God's chief purpose for 
man is the growth of moral character, the world existing 
to this end; and, if this is true, then it would appear to 
make superfluous any view of original sin associated with
•'"The Origin and Propagation fif Sin f p. 142.
99
the conceptions of original goodness or a fall. Tennant 
believes that God created man in order to rise to the goal 
which He ordained, rather than to embrace the goal from 
the outset* That it is impossible even for God to create 
'moral 1 personalities is one aspect of Tennant*s theodicy, 
but it would have been enough to assert that God did not 
want to create perfection of humanity.,, If God chose to 
shape man from humble beginnings,, then a view of original 
sin is not called for, for there would have been nothing 
to fall from.
To be sure, God created man capable of sinning, or 
else there could have been no possibility of morality. 
And that our moral task is difficult is, in one sense, 
God's responsibility; this being one reason, Tennant be­ 
lieves, why man is an object of compassion to God,
"He knoweth whereof we are made: and had we not 
been made imperfect, and liable — not once for 
all, but constantly — to sin, we had not been _ 
endowed with the prerogative of morality at all11 .
But though God willed moral development, and therefore 
the possibility of sin, and though it is difficult for 
man not to fall short of perfection, Tennant makes it clear 
that in no single instance can men point to something ac­ 
tually sinful and excuse themselves for it. At no parti­ 
cular instance is it ever necessary for men to fail to do 
what they know they ought to, and therefore can, do.
Tennant recognizes that to many the very existence of 
sin at all has seemed a mystery, requiring an unusual
•*-The Concept of Sin, p. 261. 
2Ibid., p. 272.
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explanation. Yet he wonders how God could ever have de­ 
veloped moral beings if he had not made men capable of 
sinning. And surely he is right, because it is impossible 
to dissociate these two ideas one from another. If men 
could not go wrong then they could not be good in any sense 
differing from the goodness of a clock. And, as Tennant 
believes that God desires a type of goodness for man dif­ 
ferent from mechanical and ready-made goodness, then He 
had to make men capable of sinning — in which case-, if 
there is a bias toward evil (the existence of which can­ 
not, he holds, be substantiated by psychology), then God 
would be responsible for it.
His studies in the field of the problem of sin may, 
then, be briefly described here. The doctrine of original 
sin has been held by him to be untenable from an empirical 
standpoint, and unnecessary from an a priori point of view. 
It is untenable empirically (1) because ethics cannot sanc­ 
tion a view of conduct which identifies sin with a concept 
differing from responsibility; (2) because psychology is 
not able to recognize self-conscious volition in the first 
stage of an infant; (3) because it has scarcely been de­ 
monstrated that children are more evil than good; and (4) 
because no knowledge is available concerning an alleged 
fall. And it is an unnecessary view (1) because it is not 
required to explain the universality of sinfulness, a more 
natural explanation being available; and (2) because, 
whether true or not, it does not affect man's need for re­ 
demption.
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Chapter V; Critici:; i of his Theodicy
Relation of his theodicy to hi3 views on sin
Tennant f s treatment of physical evil is independent 
of his investigations and conclusions concerning the nature 
of sin. As he does not in any way regard the incidence of 
physical evils as due to man's sinfulness, or as traceable 
even remotely to man*s nature as a free and responsible 
creature, his views on theodicy in this regard do not pre­ 
suppose his views on sin, and are independent of the validity 
or non-validity of them. In fact, scarcely any theologian 
today would ascribe physical evils to sinfulness. Some, of 
course, still regard them as in a sense a punishment for 
sin, but with the recognition that sin is its own punish­ 
ment has also come a general repudiation of this concep­ 
tion, Tennant himself does not view physical evil as in 
any way a design on the part of God for punishment of fore­ 
seen sinfulness.
Tennant solves the problem of evil in much the same 
way for both moral and physical evils, i.e., he holds that 
if the reason for the existence of the world is the reali­ 
zation of moral values, then conflict and suffering are 
needed. In this he is no doubt correct, it being mainly 
at the point of his fitting of excess evils into the pat­ 
tern of inexorable law that his theodicy is weak. But as 
for moral evil specifically, it was pointed out in the 
previous chapter that if his theodicy in this respect is 
correct, then it is somewhat superfluous to hold to a view
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of original sin. And it may now be submitted, though 
Tennant himself does no more than barely imply it, that 
if his view, that God through his plan for a moral world 
is responsible for the possibility of sin, is true, then 
it is not only difficult to hold to the doctrine of ori­ 
ginal sin, but also hard to deny the validity of his 
definition of sin.
Thus, though a theodicy such as his is not believed 
by him to proceed alone from his views on sin, or to de­ 
pend upon or presuppose them., his theodicy being thereby 
tenable even on another view of sin and its origin, never­ 
theless his theodicy not only serves if true to rein­ 
force, as WP.S pointed out, his views on sin, but also, 
if God is responsible for the possibility of sin, we can 
scarcely hold to a definition of sin other than Tennant f s, 
The converse of this is of course true, that if his defi­ 
nition of sin is correct, then man is responsible only 
for the actuality of sin, but definitely for that much 
of it, whereas it follows from Tennant J s definition of 
sin that any view of original sin should make God respon­ 
sible for that extent of the actuality of sin.
These above remarks are of course valid only within 
the context of an empirical approach to the definition of 
sin, but this much is certain, on the level of empirical 
explanation, that if one is going to have a theodicy 
which makes the possibility of sin due to God, and the 
actuality of it due to man (a necessary emphasis in a
. quotation on p. 66.
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theodicy of moral evil which sees the moral purpose for 
man to be the highest), then sin should not be defined 
except in terms of accountability. And though Tennant 
says that his theodicy does not proceed alone from his 
view of sin, (it being true for the most part that his 
treatment of the two are separate, except for the con­ 
sideration advanced which was reached by reasoning back­ 
wards from the theodicy to sin)-, it would seem in respect 
to his treatment of moral evil that for his theodicy to 
be correct, then his definition of sin would have to be 
correct. For if man is sinful only in regard to what he 
is accountable for, then it is valid to say that whereas 
the responsibility for the possibility of sin rests with 
God, the responsibility for the actuality of it lies with 
man. But if we define sin any other way than by identi­ 
fication of it with accountability, then it is only right 
to say, on an empirical, non-paradoxical level, that in 
many cases of slnfulness God is not only responsible for 
the possibility of sin, but also for its actuality. Thus 
his definition of sin may after all be seen to be of direct 
importance to his theodicy•
The view of original sin and of a bias toward evil 
accuses men of many things for which we cannot be sure 
that they are responsible. If men are so characterized, 
then to some extent they are sinning because they cannot 
help it. And to whatever extent men sin because they can­ 
not hslp it, then God is responsible not only for the pos­ 
sibility of such sin but also for its actuality.
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Moral Evil
It has already been mentioned that Tennant handles 
the problem of evil in much the same way in both its moral 
and physical aspects. He holds that God desired a cosmos 
suitable for the rise and growth of moral character, and 
that such a cosmos necessarily Includes opportunity for 
sinning, and contains suffering brought about by the regu­ 
lar course of Nature. Without the capacity for going 
wrong there could be no moral accomplishment, and without 
regularity of law there would not exist the rationality so 
essential to life and growth. Thus God had to create men 
capable of sinning, i.e. He had to make it difficult for 
men to achieve morality if morality were to mean anything, 
and He has to allow law to function independently of the 
desires and needs of individuals if rationality is to be 
maintained.
His theodicy in general may be said to be satisfac­ 
tory, with the exception of his treatment of animal pain, 
and, more importantly, his handling of those physical evils 
with which we are unable to associate any purpose or rea­ 
son, Inasmuch as he makes these events due to the inevit­ 
able consequences of natural law, law in turn being due to 
the determinate nature of a God presupposed to be good. 
That order is needed if a cosmos is to be maintained, arid 
that without the capacity for going wrong there could not 
be morality, will scarcely be gainsaid, though, as Chris­ 
tian theology has in general recognized the need of moral 
conflict and the importance of suffering.
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Actually the problem of evil is more acute at the 
point of physical evil, for it is here that the greatest 
stumbling block to faith occurs. Many are not able to be­ 
lieve in a good God in face of terrible and impersonal 
physical evils. There are others, however, who see in 
moral evil, in man's sin and inhumanity to his fellows, 
an even greater reason for disbelief than the calamities 
of Nature, though most have come to believe that the great 
suffering which is occasioned by man's brutality is not 
the fault of God, but is due to man's misuse of freedom. 
And that God does not override our moral freedom is quite 
obvious in view of the extent to which men have misused 
it. But despite the fact that God has allowed contingency 
in the realm of human affairs, and has made it possible 
for us to sin, it nevertheless is not necessary for men 
to misuse their freedom to such a degree and to sin so in­ 
tensely. That a certain degree of sin is necessary if men 
are to develop morality is hard to deny, but it does not 
follow that they must sin as much as they do, and it cer­ 
tainly is not essential to the rise and growth of morality 
that they should do so to such an extent. In any case, 
whether one sees in moral evil or in physical evil the 
greater barrier to belief in a good God and the greater 
trial to faith probably depends on the circumstances of 
the individual: for example, a person who was a refugee 
in Europe during the last war would probably be most im­ 
pressed with man's brutality, whereas a person who lives 
in Great Britain or America during peace time might more 
likely see in certain tragic occurrences of a physical
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nature the central aspect of the problem.
Some may think that it was somewhat unnecessary for 
God to have allowed the possibility of sinning, thinking 
that it would have served his purposes sufficiently only 
to have allowed physical evils, In which case Tennant 
would not be justified in making God responsible for the 
possibility of sin (and thereby in a sense for its ac­ 
tuality). And if God f s ends could have been achieved by 
means of physical evils alone, then moral evils are super­ 
fluous, and Tennant is not justified in holding God respon­ 
sible for the possibility of sin, and his views on sin are 
consequently undermined* And such is surely the case if 
it can be demonstrated that physical evils alone provide 
a sufficient framework for the accomplishment of the di­ 
vine purpose, namely, the development of moral character. 
If God could have achieved his plan by means of physical 
evils alone, then, it may reasonably be asked, why does He 
allow man 1 s inhumanity to man?
However, I do not think that it is possible to demon­ 
strate that the occurrence of physical evils are suffi­ 
cient in themselves to provide for the highest moral growth 
of man. For though physical evils may provide satisfac­ 
torily for the growth of character, of patience, courage, 
long-suffering, etc., moral evils are also needed because, 
in fact, the finest fruits of character are thereby made 
possible, namely, forgiveness and love. You cannot love 
cancer and you do not forgive earthquakes, but you do love 
and forgive persons who have sinfully wronged you or
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themselves. And if this is true then moral evil, or sin- 
fulness, is necessary to God's plan for the maximum de­ 
velopment of moral character.
And therefore Tennant ' s treatment of theodicy in re­ 
gard. to moral evil is adequate and valid, and a rethinking 
of the traditional doctrines of sin and original sin is 
thereby strongly called for.
Physical T
Before proceeding to a consideration of the central 
issue involved in Tennant f s theodicy of physical evil, 
some mention must be made of his treatment of the specific 
problem of animal pain. Very little is said by him at 
this point, and it appears that he has not sufficiently 
dealt with this question. For after all that has been 
said in recent works towards extenuation of this aspect 
of the problem of evil, for example, that the pain which 
animals experience is less intense than is ours, that they 
do not experience the higher levels of suffering such as 
spiritual bereavement and anguish-, and that by and large 
animal life is happy, the question of animal pain is still 
of great importance.
And it becomes even more puzzling that there should 
be so much of such pain when one remembers that Tennant 
finds the chief excuse for pains and suffering in the view 
that moral development at its highest presupposes their 
existence. If this view in its broad outlines is valid on 
the human level, it nevertheless is difficult to under­ 
stand how it can apply to pains on the animal level. It
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may well be that men could not attain to the finest in 
moral personality without passing through the fires of 
suffering, but how can this solution be relevant to the 
animals? Thus, if Tennant's theodicy is correct for men 
it would seem to be irrelevant to the animals* A theis- 
tic philosophy which confronts the problem of evil with 
the view that suffering makes possible the highest de­ 
gree of moral personality, must also be prepared to demon­ 
strate the applicability of such a view to the problem of 
evil on the animal level, and to show in some sense what 
is not generally held, namely, that animals are capable 
of morality and personality. In one sense it is probably 
true that animal pain is the most puzzling aspect of the 
problem of evil, for it is especially difficult to see 
much purpose in their sufferings, and because we do not 
as yet know enough about the psychology of animals and 
about God's plan for them.
It has been intimated several times heretofore that 
Dr. Tennant's treatment of the problem of evil, though in 
general outstanding and worthy of careful consideration, 
breaks down at its crucial point, i.e. in his handling of 
those very physical evils which he rigihtly recognizes as 
constituting the crux of the problem, Inasmuch as w-= are 
unable to discern any rhyme or reason in their distribu­ 
tion and appropriateness to particular circumstances*
There are two possible approaches from the Christian 
standpoint to the problem of these Excess* evils, as they
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may be called. One is to have faith that God is doing it 
all for our best even though we do not fully understand 
why. The other is to make an attempt to explain them 
completely in terms of human understanding. In the his­ 
tory of philosophy and theology many attempts have been 
made so to resolve the problem of evil but none have ever 
succeeded in finding their way to the level of the common 
people, even if any of them can be considered to have pro­ 
vided an adequate rational solution to the problem. Ten- 
-nant's theodicy marks another splendid attempt, one 
couched in terms of natural law, evolution, and moral pur­ 
pose, but it must be submitted, however, that he has not 
sueceededjwhere others have f ailed^ in providing a rational 
solution to the problem of evil, and that plain ordinary 
faith in the goodness of God is still the only way to face 
these excess evils.
Tennant holds, of course, that the existence of both 
moral and physical evil may reasonably be accounted for 
if the raison d'£tre of the world is the development of 
moral personalities. He then rightly sees the greatest 
problem to exist in the chaotic distribution of many phy­ 
sical evils which occur out of proportion to any specific 
virtues or values needing to be developed. But with this 
recognition the problem of evil is thereby carried fur­ 
ther than the general solution offered by the idea of the 
realization of moral values. To explain this aspect of 
physical evil, the crux of the problem, he then resorts
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to the conception of the inevitableness of natural law, 
which exists by virtue of the determinate nature of God. 
And it is precisely this difficulty that is unsatisfac­ 
torily explained — his classification of these 'excess 1 
evils as inevitable though incidental by-products.
For if they are inevitable, and if God is not, as 
Tennant believes, subject to a prius of law, then they 
must be what they are because God so wanted them, in which 
case they ought not to be thought of as incidental by­ 
products. And if God could not have had things another 
way., then it is incorrect to say that He is not subject 
to a prius of law. Then again, if He determined the lav/, 
or if the law is simply an aspect of His determinate na­ 
ture, then we should change our conception of His nature 
to conform to our observation of these excess1 evils. If 
"evil is a logical necessity, ultimately determined by the 
determinate nature of God11 ,^ then we must alter our con­ 
ception of God to fit with the presence of these unreason­ 
able evils.
Christian theology can not be satisfied with a theodicy 
which at its crucial point is built upon inevitabilities 
and incidental by-products., not if God is good and if this 
is God's world. Things in general must be as they are be­ 
cause God has so willed them. Once God willed the general 
situation, then the results inevitably follow, but the 
present world can not be excused on the basis that it 
could not have been otherwise to a God who desired the
., "The Trial of Faith Involved in Theological Recon­ 
struction", p. 705> Constructive Quarterly. VII.
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realization of morality. If God was only able to create 
water that at once is characterized by a capacity to 
cleanse, quench thirst, drown and destroy, then He was 
subject to a prius of law. And to prefer to say that 
natural qualities co-exist with God rather than that He 
formed them from a realm of possibilities, though quite 
possibly valid, does not solve the problem, for we are 
then obliged to fashion our idea of God in accordance with 
our observation of evil.
If God is responsible for the general system being as 
it is, He is responsible for and would have foreseen that 
class of physical evils which Tennant will not call pur­ 
posive, reasonable, or teleological. God must have known 
that many people would be affected unjustly and unreason­ 
ably when He set up his determinate system, and therefore, 
if the world expresses His nature, He must be teleologi- 
cally willing excess evils (which Tennant does not allow)* 
in which case we are not able to understand why, and must 
have faith; or else He is just allowing them to happen. 
And in this latter eventuality the problem of evil has ob­ 
viously not been solved on the basis of the theistic con­ 
ception of God. Or, again, God is in actuality subject to 
a prius of law. But it has Just been noticed that He should 
not be regarded as being unable to achieve His high plan 
for the development of moral personalities except by using 
a certain general system which entails many incidental oc­ 
currences, inevitable yet not desired.
The weakness of this theodicy is well summed up in
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C. D. Broad's searching question put to Tennant.'s view:
"Must every possible system of things with fixed 
properties and subject to general laws involve so 
widespread, so intense, so unjustly distributed, 
so useless, and so morally detrimental suffering 
as there seems to be in the actual world?" 1
Tennant of course hopes to evade the expootad criti­ 
cism that excess evils as part of God's world must in some 
sense be expressive of His nature, by holding that because 
they are only incidental by-products of the general plan
indispensable to the highest of moral purposes, they do
P not express His nature. He maintains that though they
are logical consequences of the cosmos willed by a God of 
love who "at all costs seeks our highest good", they do 
not bespeak His nature, and that though human afflictions 
are by-products of a best possible cosmos they "are not 
willed as such by God", for "God does not afflict will­ 
ingly (i.e. from His heart) the children of men".
Now if Dr. Tennant only wishes to refrain from attri­ 
buting a special divine purpose to every particular evil, 
then His view has been formulated toward a good end, but 
it is not satisfactory to Christian theology to completely 
divorce the plans and purposes of God from that very class 
of evils which are confessed to provide the crux of the
Review of Philosophical ffheologv. in Mind, XXXIX, p. 483.
^Review of E. W. Barnes, Scientific Theory and Religion. 
in The Journal of Theological Studies, XXXIV, p. 397.
^Art., "The Problem of the Existence of Moral Evil", 
p. 520, EXPOsitory Times, XXX.
^Art., "The Problem of Suffering", Elements of Pain and 
Conflict in Human Life, p. 111.
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problem of evil and the greatest obstacle to faith.
In effect, Tennant develops his theodicy in the fol­ 
lowing manner, though he does not explicitly so argue:
(1) God is good.
(2) The world was created by God.
(3) The world is of a certain description, contain­ 
ing 'excess 1 evils.
(4) Many things, because evil, do not express the 
Nature of God: they are incidental by-products.
This, however, is a desertion of the empirical method 
elsewhere consistently employed by him. In faithfulness 
to his method he should proceed in the following way:
sis The world is of such and such a nature. It was created by God, or the world is what it 
is because God is what He is.
(3) Then, seeing what the world is, God, its creator, 
must accordingly be of a nature appropriate to 
it. 1
And from this conclusion there would be these two
Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part 
XI (Second edition, by N. K. Smith). Tf we already have 
the idea of "a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity", 
says Hume, then we will probably find a way to interpret 
the occurrences of this world to be consistent with His 
nature; but if we do not begin with such a conception — 
that is to say, if we begin from scratch, i.e., empiri­ 
cally — the world "can never afford us an inference 
concerning his existence" (p. 205.)
"In short, I repeat the question: Is the world 
considered in general, and as it appears to us in this 
life, different from what a man or such a limited being 
would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, 
and benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to 
assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that, 
however consistent the world may be, allowing certain 
suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a 
Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning 
his existence. The consistence is not absolutely de­ 
nied, only the inference" (p. 205).
"I am sceptic enough to allow, that the bad ap­ 
pearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be 
compatible with such attributes as you suppose: But 
surely they can never prove these attributes" (p. 211).
Hume is, of course, saying that the conception of a 
good God is not, and can not be, an empirical deliver­ 
ance. Tennant would have been more consistent in his 
empiricism if he had adopted Hume's line of reasoning.
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consequent possibilities: (1) God is not completely good, 
or (2) the world is not thoroughly well read by us; i.e., 
faith in God's purpose is needed.
The following order of thinking would be the most 
proper way, however, and proceeds from a premise which is 
primarily, though not entirely, an a priori one:
(1) God is good.
(2) The world does not appear to be completely rea­ 
sonable, because of certain excess evils.
(3) Thus, faith that the world is under the complete 
control of a good God is needed, even though we 
do not see any reasonableness in some occurrences.
No thorough solution of the problem of evil in its 
most puzzling aspects has ever yet been worked out. Faith 
in the goodness of God is still the only way to confront 
those happenings in the world in which we are unable to 
trace the purposes of a good God; faith that He knows 
what He is doing, and that He is doing it in the long run 
for our best. And even if a satisfactory rational solu­ 
tion could be found on the basis of Christian theology it 
is doubtful if it would thereby alter the need for faith, 
for it would scarcely solve the problem on the practical, 
existential level. When people are up against it, so to 
speak, theoretical solutions are only of slight help. 
They must have faith that things in general are as they 
are because God wants them that way, and that His way is 
the best, even though they may not always be able to under­ 
stand just how some events can be for the best. Hosea ex­ 
pressed it quite appropriately:
"Let us return to the Lord, for He hath torn, and He 
will heal us — He hath smitten, and He will bind us"
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